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"I had seen a herd of elephants traveling through dense
native forest .. pacing along as if they had an appoint-
ment at the end of the world."'
Isak Dinesen (Karen Blixen)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1975, the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") 2
has had mixed success in meeting its goal of protecting endangered
species from international trade. While CITES has effectively elimi-
nated trade in some species such as exotic cats, commercial hunting
still threatens the survival of elephants, sea turtles, and many other
species.
Human beings present two principal threats to wildlife. The
most serious threat to wildlife is habitat destruction. The territory
necessary to sustain wildlife is disappearing in proportion to the rap-
idly expanding human population. Wetlands are drained for housing,
rain forests are logged for lumber, land is cleared for farms, and fields
and forests are bulldozed for the construction of roads and highways.
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. The author would like to
thank Leslie Malkin, Paul Birch, and Shirley Steele for their help on this Article.
1. I. DINESEN, SHADOWS ON THE GRASS (1960). Isak Dinesen's (Karen Blixen) exper-
iences were immortalized in her book, and the popular movie, Out of Africa.
2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
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The second principal threat to wildlife is the commercial exploitation
of wild animals through hunting and trapping. International trade in
wildlife is an enormous industry. It is estimated that the industry
generates as much as five billion dollars annually.3 The central issue
facing regulation of wildlife trade is finding the appropriate balance
between the economic value of taking wildlife and the value of wildlife
preservation. Unfortunately, the balancing often results in a zero-sum
conflict in which commercial interests and preservation cannot
coexist.
4
The plight of the gorilla population in Rwanda exemplifies the
extreme difficulty in striking a balance between these competing inter-
ests. Rwanda is one of the poorest sub-Saharan countries in Africa.5
It has a population of 4.7 million people, 95% of whom are subsis-
tence farmers who eke out a living on two-acre farms.6 Unfortu-
nately, the human population is expanding at an annual rate of 4%,
adding 23,000 new families to the land each year. 7 The scarcity of
land and lack of alternate sources of income compelled many
Rwandans to supplement their income by exploiting the wildlife on
the forty-square-mile gorilla preserve known as the Parc National Des
Volcans. Poaching became endemic in the park. Many gorillas were
captured alive and sold on the black market to European and Ameri-
can zoos; many more were killed by snares set for antelope and deer.8
Despite laws strictly prohibiting poaching, the gorillas were simply
not safe without an economic motive for their protection. No matter
3. The World Wildlife Fund has estimated the declared value of the international wild-
life trade to be $5 billion. World Trade in Wildlife, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND FACTSHEET
(1986). It is difficult to calculate accurately the volume of trade given its immense proportions,
its tendency to involve exotic species, and the difference in price between the raw commodity
and the retail product. Nonetheless, the trade volume is very large. For example, in 1984,
over 200,000 psittacines (parrots, parakeets, cockatoos, macaws, lories, and lorikeets) were
legally imported into the United States for sale as pets. During the same period of time, as
many as 60,000 more may have been smuggled into the country. Dixon, Evaluation of the
Psittacine Importation Process in the United States, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 3 (1986).
4. A zero-sum conflict is a situation in which the preferences of the participants within
the available alternatives are diametrically opposed. In other words, there can only be a.win-
ner and a loser with no room for compromise or cooperation. Most analysts agree that zero-
sum conflicts are the exception rather than the rule in real-world conditions. For a compre-
hensive discussion of zero-sum "games," see generally A. RAPOPORT, TwO-PERSON GAME
THEORY (1966).
5. World Development Report, WORLD BANK 202, tab. 1 (1987).
6. Cahill, Love and Death in Gorilla Country, in A WOLVERINE is EATING MY LEG 31
(1989).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 30.
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how many antipoaching patrols were established, the Rwandan peo-
ple's financial and nutritional needs overcame enforcement efforts.
In response to this economic pressure, coupled with the fear that
the gorilla population would completely disappear, the Rwandan gov-
ernment opened the park to tourism. 9 The opening of the park allevi-
ated the threat to the gorilla population in Rwanda, in part, because it
made more economic sense to preserve a viable population as a tourist
attraction than to poach and ultimately exterminate the gorillas.
Preservationist groups opposed opening the park to tourists.
One such advocate was Dian Fossey, a secular saint in wildlife preser-
vation. 10 Fossey fiercely believed that humans should preserve goril-
las and other wildlife for their intrinsic value. The concept of
economic valuation of the animals was alien to her. Thus, she vehe-
mently opposed the opening of the park to tourists even though it
created an important source of income for Rwanda." Despite Fos-
sey's opposition, the opening of the park to tourism eventually solved
the gorilla poaching problem. 12 Meanwhile, the Rwandan govern-
ment initiated a campaign to educate the local people as to both the
economic and aesthetic benefits of preserving wildlife.' 3
The dichotomy between a principled concern for animals and the
economic pressure for wildlife commerce pervades the entire conser-
vation movement and presents a particular problem for CITES' oper-
ation. This Article examines the structure of the convention and
focuses on three case histories in which the convention was ineffective
in limiting wildlife trade because it inadequately addressed the strong
economic pressures of the human population.
II. CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
IN ENDANGERED SPECIES
CITES was drafted in 1973 and has been hailed as the most suc-
cessful international treaty on the conservation of wildlife.' 4 Twenty-
9. See id. at 32.
10. See generally F. MOWAT, WOMAN IN THE MISTS 162-75 (1987).
11. Dian Fossey's work with the mountain gorillas in Rwanda is recorded in her own
journals, a biography by Farley Mowat, and a recent film starring Sigourney Weaver. Fossey's
antipathy toward tourism is well documented in F. MOWAT, supra note 10; see also Cahill,
supra note 6. Fossey's concerns were not unfounded; visitors may have transmitted human
diseases to gorillas. F. MOWAT, supra note 10, at 348-49.
12. See F. MOWAT, supra note 10, at 36.
13. Cahill, supra note 6. For a more pessimistic view, see F. MOWAT, supra note 10, at
370-71.
14. For the most in depth discussion, see generally D. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
1990]
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one nations initially signed the treaty; however, participation has ex-
panded at such a remarkable rate that by 1988 the treaty had ninety-
eight signatories. 15 CITES attempts to control wildlife trade by re-
quiring special export and import permits for international commerce
in endangered species.
A. Overview
The convention focuses exclusively on the regulation of interna-
tional trade. 16 It contains no restrictions on domestic trade or re-
quirements for habitat protection that could be construed as
infringements on sovereignty. Although the treaty establishes a per-
manent Secretariat for administrative purposes, 17 it creates no supra-
national enforcement structure. Nevertheless, it does require parties
to designate one "Management Authority" to grant import and ex-
port permits and at least one "Scientific Authority" to determine
whether trade in a particular species is detrimental to its survival.' 8
1. United States' Adoption of CITES
The United States Congress ratified and implemented CITES as
one part of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 19 The United
States Supreme Court has characterized the ESA as "the most com-
prehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
IN ENDANGERED SPECIES (1989); S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 240 (1985);
Kosloff & Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.- No Carrot,
But Where's the Stick?, 17 ENVTL. L. REV. 10222 (1987).
15. The signatory countries as of 1988 include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austra-
lia, Austria, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands as soon as authorities enact the
appropriate legislation), The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gambia,
German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Kiribati, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Pakistan, Panama, Paupua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Portugal,
Rwanda, St. Lucia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuni-
sia, Tuvalu, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates (the first signatory to
withdraw from the convention), United Kingdom (including Hong Kong, the Channel Islands,
Bermuda and various other Crown territories), United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire,
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 1987 TREATIES IN FORCE 230.
16. D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at xvii.
17. CITES, supra note 2, art. XII.
18. Id. art. IX.
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
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enacted by any nation."'20 The ESA attempts to preserve ecosystems
by regulating domestic and international trade in threatened species
and by protecting important habitats.21
The Act explicitly prohibits the trade of any wildlife in contra-
vention of CITES or the possession of specimens obtained through
unlawful trade. 22 CITES also lists approximately fifty percent of the
species protected by the ESA.23 Generally, the ESA is more restric-
tive than CITES; the ESA only permits the importation or exporta-
tion of protected species for scientific research, enhancement of
species propagation, and for certain types of exhibitions.
24
In addition, CITES dovetails with the Lacey Act,25 which makes
it a violation of federal law for any person to import or export animals
taken, transported, or sold in violation of a treaty or the laws of a
foreign country. 26 As originally enacted in 1900, the purpose of the
Lacey Act was merely to prohibit interstate commerce in wildlife
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of state law. How-
ever, in 1935, Congress expanded the Lacey Act to apply to foreign
commerce, and in 1981, it was consolidated with the Black Bass
Act.27 These changes toughened the penalty provisions of the Lacey
Act, making it the most effective enforcement device for federal wild-
life officials. 28
2. United States' Enforcement of CITES
In order to effectively enforce CITES, the United States has des-
ignated riine cities as ports of entry for trade in wildlife and fourteen
20. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
21. The stated purposes of the ESA are to preserve ecosystems, to conserve endangered
and threatened species, and to achieve the purposes of many treaties. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
The ESA designates the Secretary of the Interior as both the Management Authority and
Scientific Authority for the issuance of import and export permits. Id. § 1537(a).
22. Id. § 1538.
23. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1989) (CITES list) with 50 C.F.R. §§ 17, 18 (1989) (ESA
list). ,
24. CITES, supra note 2, art. XIV. Article XIV of CITES specifically allows for domes-
tic legislation with stricter controls than those provided by the convention.
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78.
26. See generally Cites 1983 Annual Report No. 9, FEDERAL WILDLIFE PERMIT OFFICE
(1983) [hereinafter Annual Report].
27. Id.
28. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollutions of the Senate Comm. on Env't and
Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1984) (statement of F. Henry Habicht, Asst. Attor-
ney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Hearings].
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cities as entry destinations for trade in plants.29 At these locations,
agents and inspectors of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("Wildlife Service") inspect the wildlife with assistance from customs
agents and other federal agents. Customs officials interdict illegal
shipments of wildlife at all ports other than those designated a port of
entry. 30
While CITES, the ESA, and the Lacey Act provide an impres-
sive array of legal tools to regulate trade in endangered species, en-
forcement is hampered by a lack of personnel and administrative
resources. For example, in 1983, 43,000 shipments of wildlife were
imported into the United States and 12,000 were exported, for an ap-
proximate total of 55,000 shipments. 31 The Wildlife Service has a to-
tal of only fifty-five wildlife inspectors spread among the nine ports of
entry designated for wildlife, making systematic inspection virtually
impossible. 32 Furthermore, United States Customs agents and Border
Patrol officers lack sufficient education to identify species and tend to
place a higher priority on the prevention of drug smuggling.33
Article VIII of CITES requires signatory countries to take ap-
propriate measures to enforce the treaty, including provisions outlin-
ing penalties and confiscations. 34 However, the specific methods of
enforcement are left to the individual parties.35 Such methods may
include penalties of jail sentences or monetary fines. Unfortunately,
the fines and sentences that have been imposed have been light. Con-
sequently, confiscation of contraband has been the most effective and
commonly-used enforcement device.
36
29. The ports of entry are New York, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New
Orleans, Dallas-Fort Worth, Seattle, and Honolulu. 50 C.F.R. § 14.12. The Department of
Agriculture is primarily responsible for CITES' enforcement with respect to plants. It has
restricted the importation and exportation of all plants to fourteen ports in order to facilitate
quarantine controls. These are Nogales, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Miami, Hon-
olulu, New Orleans, Hoboken, New York, San Juan, Brownsville, El Paso, Laredo, and Seat-
tle. 49 Fed. Reg. 42,938 (1984).
30. 50 C.F.R. §§ 14.51-.54.
31. Annual Report, supra note 26.
32. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 14, at 10229.
33. Hearings, supra note 28, at 16-19 (statement of William R. Logan, Director, Office of
Investigations, United States Customs Service).
34. CITES, supra note 2, art. VIII.
35. Id. art. VIII(l).
36. In practice, confiscation seems to be the strongest financial deterrent. Fines are fre-
quently small, but the possibility of losing valuable goods significantly increases the risk in any
risk-benefit calculation. For example, a Canadian who illegally imported worked ivory into
Canada in 1978 reportedly suffered a small fine, but lost $150,000 worth of ivory. S. LYSTER,
supra note 14, at 265.
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Confiscation can be an effective deterrent because the loss of a
valuable consignment may inflict a serious financial blow on the im-
porter. However, it can also present difficulties for the enforcing
agency. Fear of disease and the high cost of returning the wildlife to
its natural habitat severely impede reintroduction of confiscated ani-
mals. The problem is exacerbated by the convention's requirements
that the state of import, often a relatively poor developing country,
must pay the cost of reintroduction. 37 For example, in 1978, United
States Customs agents seized eighteen rare and almost extinct Tahi-
tian lories illegally smuggled into the United States.38 The birds were
still alive after the seizure, but could not be returned to their natural
habitat because authorities feared they may have been exposed to
avian diseases in the United States which are not present in Polynesia.
The customs authorities then faced the difficult task of finding a ref-
uge for the lories. The birds were eventually presented to the San
Diego Zoo in lieu of being returned to the wild.39
B. The CITES' Appendices
CITES contains three appendices that categorize species on the
basis of their real or potential danger of extinction from trade. ° With
a few exceptions, the appendices prohibit international trade in the
listed species without certain required permits. The permit require-
ments extend to specimens living or dead and include "any readily
37. The wildlife trade overwhelmingly flows from South to North. The developing na-
tions of South America, Africa, and Asia are generally the suppliers, while the wealthy indus-
trialized nations of Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan are the consumers. T.
MILLIKEN, DECIMATION OF WORLD WILDLIFE: JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE (1988). However,
there are exceptions; the United States is both a consumer and a major supplier of wildlife. Id.
38. Leakey, Lifting the Ban Would Mean Open Season, The Independent, June 30, 1990,
at 13.
39. Amending the Black Bass and Lacey Acts: Hearings on S. 1882 Before the Subcomm.
on Resource Protections of the Senate Comm. on the Env't and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29 (1979) (statement of William Green, Director, Office of Investigations, United States
Customs Service). Article VIII(4)(b) of CITES requires the state confiscating the shipment to
consult with the state of export and "return the specimen to that state at the expense of that
state, or to a rescue center or such other place as the Management Authority deems appropri-
ate and consistent .. .[with the treaty]." CITES, supra note 2, art. VIII(4)(b).
Occasionally confiscations have resulted in the reintroduction of a species which died out
in the United States. When thick billed parrots smuggled from Mexico were seized, they were
reintroduced into a former habitat in the Chiricahua Mountains of Southern Arizona. L.A.
Times, Dec. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 1. Unfortunately such success stories are rare. When 205
Amazon parrots were seized, the Wildlife Service was forced to lodge them at Bush Gardens in
Van Nuys, California at the eventual cost of $100,000. Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1978, § C, at 2.
40. CITES, supra note 2, apps. I, II, IV.
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recognizable part or derivative thereof."'4 1 This effectively regulates
products containing the hides, skins, teeth, or other parts of protected
animals.
42
Appendix I of CITES contains a list of "all species threatened
with extinction which are or may be affected by trade. '43 CITES ef-
fectively prohibits international commercial trade in Appendix I spe-
cies. When CITES first went into effect, Appendix I contained
approximately 450 species including such well-known endangered
species as tigers, cheetahs, humpback whales, and peregrine falcons.44
It also included less publicized endangered species such as the
Komodo lizards, lemurs, and various types of crocodiles. 45 Since
then, Appendix I has grown to include over 700 animal species and
several thousand plant species.
46
CITES does allow noncommercial trade in Appendix I species in
very limited circumstances. The shipper must first obtain an export
permit from the country of origin and an import permit from the
country of destination. 47 Under the treaty, the designated Scientific
Authority of the country of origin will grant an export permit only if
it is determined that the "export will not be detrimental to the sur-
vival of that species."'4 Then, the designated Management Authority
must determine whether the shipper acquired the specimen legally,
and whether the country of designation granted an import permit for
the plant or animal. 4 9 Similarly, the Scientific Authority of the state
of import must determine whether the import is for purposes detri-
mental to the survival of the species, and the Management Authority
must determine whether the plant or animal will be used for primarily
commercial purposes, before an import permit will be granted. 50
Appendix II contains species which are not sufficiently endan-
gered by international trade to warrant their inclusion in Appendix
1.51 Nevertheless, these species are in sufficient danger to warrant
41. Id. art. I(b).
42. Id.
43. Id. art. II(1).
44. Id. app. I.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. art. 111(2), (3).
48. Id. art. III(2)(a).
49. Id. art. III(2)(b), (d).
50. Id. art. III (3).
51. Id. art. II(2)(a).
238 [Vol. 13:231
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some control of trade.52 Appendix II species include those which are
heavily traded but have relatively stable populations. Approximately
40,000 species of plants and animals are listed in Appendix II. How-
ever, the size of the list is misleadingly small since it often lists plants
and animals by their family names rather than their specific species.
For example, Appendix II names as a single entry the family orchida-
cae which includes 400 to 800 genera of orchids and comprises 25,000
to 35,000 different species. 53 To facilitate identification, the Appendix
also lists species which are not threatened, but are similar in appear-
ance and "look-like" threatened species.54 This provision is particu-
larly important in enforcing trade restrictions on genera such as
parrots, frogs, or crocodiles where even specialists have difficulty dis-
tinguishing among species. 55
In 1973, the Plenipotentiary Conference in Washington drafted
the original lists of species for Appendices I and II. Any signatory
country may suggest additions of species to the appendices. These
suggestions must be supported by strong empirical evidence of endan-
52. Id. art. 11(2).
53. The International Orchid Trade, AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 377 (1988-1989).
Authorities differ on the exact number of species. Id.
54. CITES, supra note 2, art. II(2)(b). The United States has taken the position that if a
species is listed in Appendix II for "look-like" reasons alone, the export state need not deter-
mine whether proposed exports of the species will be detrimental to the survival of that species.
The export state need only evaluate if the survival ability of the endangered species will be
threatened by proposed exports of the look-like species. For example, the Wildlife Service
decided that bobcats were listed in Appendix II for purely look-like reasons. As a result, it was
not necessary for the service to calculate whether the proposed export levels of bobcat pelts
would be detrimental to the survival of bobcats. The service only needed to consider whether
proposed export levels would be detrimental to the survival of other spotted cats which the
bobcat was listed to protect. 48 Fed. Reg. 37,494 (1983). Other parties to the convention have
taken issue with this view, arguing that once a species is listed under article II(2)(a) or II(2)(b),
it should be accorded full protection. See CITES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH MEETING
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 139-40 (1984) [hereinafter FOURTH CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS].
55. There are twenty categories of taxonomic classifications ranging from kingdom down
to subspecies. CITES classifies most frequently by species. However, a higher taxon may be
used when all of the species are threatened or when identification between species creates en-
forcement problems. The use of subspecies appears to be disfavored. See CITES, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES Res. 2.20 (1980)
[hereinafter SECOND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS].
One minor but vexing problem facing CITES is the lack of uniformity in taxonomic clas-
sifications. Accordingly, the parties have adopted standard texts for consistent classifications.
For example, the Dictionary of Flowering Plants and Ferns was adopted as the standard refer-
ence for plants. See J.C. WILLIS, DICTIONARY OF FLOWERING PLANTS AND FERNS (1973).
Similarly, authoritative works have been adopted for birds and mammals. FOURTH CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 77-78 (res. 4.23).
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germent 56 and then approved by a two-thirds majority of the voting
parties. 57 Additions to the appendices are considered either at the bi-
ennial meetings or by mail between the meetings.5 8 Plants or animals
may be removed from either list or transferred from one list to an-
other by the same process. However, there is a strong presumption
against changes that lower the level of protection for any given
species. 59
Appendix III differs from the first two appendices. It lists spe-
cies that a signatory country internally regulates to prevent or restrict
exploitation, but needs additional international cooperation for effec-
tive regulation. 6° Any member country may add a species to Appen-
dix III if the species is endangered in that country, regardless of its
status in the world at large. For example, the scarlet macaw was
listed in Appendix III at the request of Costa Rica. However, this
bird may be legally shipped from Panama where it is not endangered.
Trade in species listed in Appendix III merely requires an export per-
mit certifying that the shipper obtained the specimen legally.61
C. Exceptions to the CITES Permit Requirements
Article VII of CITES lists a series of exceptions to the permit
56. CITES, supra note 2, art. XV(1)(a). The text of the convention provides broad condi-
tions for including species in the appendices. More detailed criteria were later provided at the
Berne Conference, held one year after the convention's entry into force. See CITES, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 31 (1976) [herein-
after FIRST CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. The Berne Criteria have been criticized because of
the vagueness of the adopted standards. See Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the
CITES Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 247, 249-52 (1987).
57. CITES, supra note 2, art. XV(1)(b).
58. Id. art. XV(1), (2).
59. The First Conference of the Parties, held in Berne, Switzerland, adopted specific cri-
teria to amend the appendices which created a presumption against reducing the protection
given to any species.
The addition to and deletion from the appendices take (sic) different problems
requiring different approaches by the conference. If an error is made by the confer-
ence by unnecessarily placing a plant or animal on an appendix, the result is the
imposition of a documentation requirement. If however, it errs in prematurely re-
moving a plant or animal from protection, or lowering the level of protection af-
forded, the result can be the permanent loss of the resource. If it errs it should be
therefore toward protection of the resource.
FIRST CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 56, at 33 (conf. 1.3). The conference then es-
tablished very strict conditions which must be met before a species' protection can be reduced.
These conditions include "positive scientific evidence that the plant or animal can withstand
the exploitation resulting from the removal of protection" and require a well-documented pop-
ulation survey of the species that justifies resuming unregulated commercial trade. Id.
60. CITES, supra note 2, art. 11(3).
61. Id. art. V(2).
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requirements for Appendices I, II, and III. Permits are not required
for the shipment of specimens which 1) were acquired by the shipper
prior to the listing of the species;62 2) are personal or household ef-
fects;63 3) have been bred in captivity or are artificially propagated
plants; 64 4) are noncommercial loans or exchanges between scientific
institutions;65 or 5) are for traveling circuses and exhibitions. 66
CITES also allows member countries to exempt themselves from
the permit requirements for a particular species by taking a "reserva-
tion.''67 A reservation must designate the species it covers and may be
taken either at the time the member country joins the convention or
within 90 days of any amendment to the appendices. 68 A party which
reserves a species is treated as a nonparty with respect to that spe-
cies. 69 For example, Japan has taken a reservation on Green Hawks-
bill and Olive Ridley turtles, which are listed in Appendix I. The
Japanese use large quantities of the turtle leather and shells for such
popular products as bekko, handbags, and luggage. 70
Article VII(4) of CITES provides an additional exemption for
animals "bred in captivity" for commercial purposes. Specific criteria
must be satisfied before a species is considered to be "bred in captiv-
ity."' 71 The member country must establish the breeding stock in a
manner not detrimental to the survival of the species in the wild.72
The stock must be managed in a manner "capable of reliably produc-
ing second-generation offspring in a controlled environment" 73 and in
a manner that will allow the member country to maintain the stock
indefinitely.
Similarly, the convention treats "ranching" of Appendix I spe-
62. Id. art. VII(2).
63. Id. art. VII(3).
64. Id. art. VII(4), (5).
65. Id. art. VII(6).
66. Id. art. VII(7).
67. Id. art. XXIII. For a discussion of some of the difficulties with the CITES reserva-
tion provision, see Comment, Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, 14 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 429, 430 (1981).
68. FOURTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54.
69. Id.
70. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 30, 1987, at 9. Because of Japan's reservation and the
parties' continuing trade without reservations, CITES has been noticeably ineffective in regu-
lating the trade in sea turtle products. See M. WEBER, E. ROET, P. ESCHERICH, R. MC-
MANUS, J. TEEPLE-HEWES, SEA TURTLES IN TRADE, AN EVALUATION (1983).
71. The criteria were adopted at the San Jose Conference of March 1979. SECOND CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 55.
72. Id.
73. CITES, supra note 2, art. VIII(4)(b)(iii).
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cies as a special exemption. 74 Ranching operations are not closed cy-
cle like captive breeding. Rather, ranching involves the controlled
rearing of wildlife from eggs or young taken from the wild.75 The
status of ranching is the subject of heated debate among CITES mem-
ber countries.
D. Philosophical Basis of CITES
Few would argue that we should allow a species to become ex-
tinct without carefully considering the benefits and detriments to soci-
ety. Many, perhaps most of us, have a strong intuitive belief that the
potential loss of an entire species outweighs any potential economic
consideration. But what are the justifications for these beliefs? Does
society have concrete reasons for preventing the extinction of a
species?
There are two great schools of thought on how to define and
measure the value of natural objects. The first, a homocentric ap-
proach, views animals and other natural objects as possessing only
instrumental value to human beings.76 This view defines the value of
wildlife solely in terms of its utility to the human species. 77 Accord-
ingly, it affords no intrinsic value to nonhuman species. The second
great school of thought is the intrinsic value approach.78 This view
maintains that all natural objects have an inherent and intrinsic value
that humans should respect. 79 The intrinsic value of a species is not
derived from any human concept of utility, but is independent of any
use or function they may have to other species-they are valuable in
and of themselves.
80
The homocentric school of thought dominates the debate over
the value of natural objects in the United States, despite a vocal oppo-
sition.8 ' It is the foundation underlying the approach to the environ-
ment that has been adopted by most modem economists. This
approach has two immediate economic implications: first, animals are
74. CITES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PAR-
TIES 60 (1981) [hereinafter THIRD CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS].
75. Id.
76. See generally Randall, Human Preferences, Economics, and the Preservation of Spe-
cies, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES (B. Norton ed. 1986).
77. Callicott, On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF
SPECIES 139 (B. Norton ed. 1986).
78. Id. at 139-40.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 140.
81. Id.
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instruments for human satisfaction; second, animals are a scarce re-
source.8 2 Thus, under the homocentric approach, the preservation of
species is but one part of the larger problem of efficiently allocating
scarce resources.
A popular assumption among free market economists is that the
most efficient allocation of resources is through the private sector.8 3
What conservationists view as environmental devastation, some econ-
omists consider maximization of wealth. Economists focus on the sat-
isfaction of human wants in a never ending struggle to attain the good
life. To them, wildlife is merely a resource to be exploited, and the
market is the most efficient means of exploitation. Under this view,
the only real problem is scarcity of resources. For example, in a sim-
ple homocentric economic model, elephants serve only two functions:
they are a supplier of ivory and they attract tourists. If the sale of
ivory generates more revenue than tourism, then economists would
argue that elephants should only be used for trade in ivory.
Most economists would concede that the free market allocation
of resources breaks down when faced with environmental issues such
as the preservation of wildlife or the maintenance of air quality.
When this happens, some sort of governmental regulation is neces-
sary.8 4 Some economists advocate "welfare economics"-a regula-
tory structure which mimics the market by assigning a value to
"goods" and utilizing a cost-benefit analysis to determine the proper
allocation of such goods.85 Although the term seems to imply public
assistance programs for the poor, welfare economics actually pro-
motes the general welfare of all members of society by ensuring that
environmental resources are not severely overused or misused. Using
82. See id. at 140, 162.
83. The Environmental Decade: Hearings on H.R. 44-315 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, 192 (1970) (statement of
Dr. All6n V. Kneese, Director, Quality of the Environment Program, Resources for the
Future).
84. In testimony before a congressional committee in 1970, Dr. Allen Kneese, a respected
economist, stated:
Our usual mechanism for limiting the use of resources and leading them into their
highest productivity employments is the prices which are established in markets
through exchanges between buyers and sellers. For common property resources this
mechanism does not function, and they must become the focus for collective or pub-
lic management, unless they are to be severely overused and misused.
Id.
85. The literature in this area is vast. For a short overview, see David & Lin, On Measur-
ing the Economic Value of Wildlife, in VALUING WILDLIFE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PER-
SPECTIVES (D. Decker & G. Goff eds. 1987).
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this approach, economists determine the monetary value of the goods
to be regulated to the individuals who use them. The gains by mem-
bers of society who are made better off from use of the goods would
then be measured against the detriment to those who are made worse
off by the use of the goods.
Assigning monetary values to wildlife is a difficult, if not impossi-
ble, methodological task. Most economic studies of wildlife have fo-
cused on consumptive-use values, such as those generated by
hunting.8 6 Consumptive-use values form a major category of wildlife
benefits, and the members of society receiving these values are easily
identified. However, there also exist nonconsumptive-use values
which must be measured. These are the values people attach to wild-
life for recreational purposes or for the simple pleasure of knowing
that the species continues to exist. One method of calculating non-
consumptive-use values is by survey questionnaires. Respondents are
asked to place a monetary value on the species in question. However,
the speculative nature of such methods is obvious.
Society objects to using a cost-benefit approach for justifying its
endangered species policy because of the impossibility of placing a
value on saving a species from extinction. The value of a species to
future generations in monetary terms cannot be measured. Because
the present generation cannot predict the direction of cultural evolu-
tion and scientific progress, it cannot accurately evaluate the future
utility of a given species.
Thus, economics cannot explain why an Indonesian fisherman
should not catch sea turtles and sell them to Japan, or why govern-
ments should prohibit elephant poaching. As a result, many conser-
vationists, seeking arguments for preserving species, have adopted a
philosophy of animal rights.8 7 Arguably, it may be inappropriate to
86. See T. REGAN & P. SINGER, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATION 19 (1976);
see also Randall, supra note 76, at 84, 87-88.
87. See generally T. REGAN & P. SINGER, supra note 86, at 19. Both Singer and Regan
argue for a new ethical status of animals by applying the principle of equality, to include
nonhuman as well as human animal species. This view should not be confused with positions
taken by environmentalists such as Aldo Leopold. Leopold's appreciation of wildlife was set
in the context of ecological balance, as opposed to valuing animals as important in themselves.
While he argued that each species was valuable, the value was grounded in its role within the
ecology. In his famous book, Sand County Almanac, Leopold praised hunting. Proponents of
animal rights feel that Leopold's theory lacks a solid ontological foundation. At least one
commentator has attempted to address this problem by arguing that animal rights are a logical
progression from human rights, as both are rooted in an evolving concept of natural law.
Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (1987). This
leads to an ironic paradox of prohibiting what nature once dictated-hunting. Another inter-
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apply a rights analysis to an entire species because rights are held by
individuals, not groups. As one noted critic, Joel Feinberg, observed:
"A whole collection, as such, cannot have beliefs, expectations, wants
or desires .... Individual elephants can have interests, but the species
elephant cannot."88 Additionally, by taking animal rights to its logi-
cal conclusion, the relationship between predators and prey becomes
problematic. At the heart of the animal rights movement, then, may
be a basic repugnance for nature in its wild state.
The novel idea-that perhaps man is not the measure of all
things in nature and the hierarchy we have spent thousands of years
establishing is dangerous to other species and to ourselves-is ex-
tremely powerful and fraught with dark implications. Many environ-
mental researchers and animal rights advocates believe there is an
urgent need for a biocentric or "deep ecology" approach to nature
rather than the "shallow ecology" of conventional conservation. 89
Deep ecologists have an appreciation for the predator/prey food
chains and accept the inevitability of life sacrificing other life to en-
sure its survival, a view not shared by animal liberationists. Deep
ecologists prefer a holistic approach to nature, rather than the atomis-
tic view held by animal rights advocates. Further, they value the eco-
logical system as a whole, believing that the whole carries more
weight than any of its component parts. 90
CITES contains neither animal rights nor deep ecology philoso-
phy. It is both a conservation and trade instrument. Although its
primary goal is to preserve endangered species, its secondary goal is to
allow a sustainable level of exploitation of those species.
In a compelling essay concerning our duties to nature, Professor
Donald Regan presented a hypothetical situation to help determine
esting approach was Andree Collard's synthesis of feminist theory with animal rights con-
tained in a critique of patriarchal exploitation. A. COLLARD & J. CONTRUCCI, RAPE OF THE
WILD: MAN'S VIOLENCE AGAINST ANIMALS AND THE EARTH (1989).
88. Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND EN-
VIRONMENTAL CRISIS (W. Blackstone ed. 1974).
89. J. CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHI-
LOSOPHY (1988); R. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE (1987); see also W. BLACKSTONE, PHI-
LOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS; Callicott, supra note 77, at 148-51.
90. The most cogent philosophical analysis of deep ecology is found in R. NASH, supra
note 89; see also J. CALLICOTT, supra note 89. For the differences between animal rights and
deep ecology, see Johnson, Animal Liberation versus the Land Ethic, 3 ENVTL. ETHICS 3
(1981). For an interesting merger of feminist theory with deep ecology, see A. COLLARD & J.
CONTRUCCI, supra note 87.
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what value we give to nature. 91 He suggests that part of the value of
natural objects is the pleasure humans receive from knowing that a
natural object exists, regardless of whether the object has a concrete
utilitarian function. 92 This is a homocentric value since it derives
from human use, however abstract. But Professor Regan then asks, if
the last person on earth could push a button to destroy the Grand
Canyon as she dies, would it be wrong for her to push the button?93
He concludes that even though the Grand Canyon would no longer
serve a homocentric function, it would be wrong to destroy it.94 Re-
gan's answer is correct, but not for utilitarian reasons. An over-
whelming majority of people would agree that it would be wrong for a
natural object of beauty to be destroyed simply because consciousness
no longer exists to enjoy it. Such a conclusion would be reached, not
through rational scrutiny based on animal rights or welfare econom-
ics, but through a deep felt intuition.
The theoretical foundation of CITES is classically political. The
convention attempts to balance the vague intuitive notion that the
preservation of species is good, against commercial demands for its
exploitation. The stress between these competing interests is the core
of the structural weakness of the convention. The three studies which
follow illustrate how the commercial benefit of exploiting endangered
species is in constant competition with the countervailing and amor-
phous value we place on their preservation.
III. CASE STUDIES
The participating nations who drafted CITES in 1973 were
chiefly concerned with blocking unscrupulous trade in wildlife and its
derivative products. Looming behind those concerns was the vague
image of poachers and unsavory middlemen with no respect or appre-
ciation for the beauty of nature. Thus, it is ironic that one of the
biggest controversies over CITES to date dealt not with unscrupulous
trade, but instead involved importation of an endangered species by a
respectable American zoo.
For the past thirty years, American zoos have been at the fore-
91. Regan, Duties of Preservation, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES 205 (B. Norton ed.
1986).
92. Id.
93. Id. Of course, the use of the "last person" argument does not put any special value
on wildlife since it can be used for artificial objects, such as artwork. It is not so much an
argument for intrinsic value, as for the marvelously irrational way humans value things.
94. See Regan, supra note 91, at 206.
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front of efforts to save endangered species. Many zoos have estab-
lished reputations as successful breeders of species whose habitats are
being destroyed. For example, the Cincinnati Zoo has been remarka-
bly successful in breeding lowland gorillas in captivity. Similarly, the
San Diego Zoo has made heroic efforts to save the California Condor.
These zoos have become stationary arks amidst a flood of ecological
disaster.
A. The Giant Panda
Despite these efforts, some American zoos have become em-
broiled in a controversy over CITES. One dispute involves a short-
term loan of rare giant pandas by the People's Republic of China to
American zoos. At issue is whether the very survival of the giant
panda is endangered by removing two of the few remaining pandas
capable of breeding in captivity from their familiar habitat. The issue
came to a head when new information emerged suggesting that giant
pandas are in far worse danger than previously realized.
1. The Plight of the Panda
Fewer than one thousand wild giant pandas exist in China. 95
They live in small scattered groups that are highly vulnerable to ex-
tinction from food shortages, disease, poaching, and an insufficient
breeding-age population. However, the primary problem facing pan-
das is the loss of habitat due to agricultural expansion. Because pan-
das have a specialized diet of bamboo shoots and leaves, they are
vulnerable to the periodic "die-offs" of various bamboo species which
flower and then die. 96 Logging and agricultural expansion eliminates
travel corridors and prevents the animals from finding alternative
sources of bamboo. During one such die-off in the Qionglia Moun-
95. Johnson, Schaller & Hu Jinchu, Responses of Giant Pandas to a Bamboo Die-off, 4
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC RES. 161, 164 (1988).
96. Although pandas may eat various plants, as well as meat, more than 99% of their
food consists of bamboo stems, branches, and leaves. Id. The panda's feeding habits are pecu-
liar. It has the short digestive track of a carnivore, but the diet of a herbivore. Thus, it re-
quires vast quantities of bamboo because it cannot digest the plant efficiently. Pandas devote
96% of their time to feeding and resting. Id. The species has a specialized digit on their
forepaw to strip leaves off the bamboo shoots. See generally DAVIS, THE GIANT PANDA, A
MORPHOLOGICAL STUDY OF EVOLUTIONARY MECHANISMS (1964).
Bamboo usually reproduces by producing shoots from rhizomes, but periodically an en-
tire species will flower and die. If an alternative bamboo species is unavailable within the
panda's home range, the panda must either expand its range or emigrate. Johnson, supra note
95, at 161.
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tains between 1983 and 1987, Chinese wildlife authorities found the
bodies of 62 pandas that died of starvation.
9 7
Poaching presents another major threat to the survival of giant
pandas. In February 1988, for example, Chinese authorities recov-
ered 146 giant panda pelts, representing roughly fifteen percent of the
estimated pandas alive in the wild.98 Panda pelts may be worth as
much as $15,000 on the Japanese black market.99
The panda's slow breeding cycle contributes to the problem of
population regeneration. They require six or more years to sexually
mature and generally breed only during a short period in the
spring. 100 In addition, they require two years between successful
births and seldom have more than one cub. 101 With a five year prime
breeding span, the average female panda can only give birth to two or
three cubs in its lifetime. 10 2 The slow breeding rate of pandas would
not normally be a problem, but for the loss of habitat, the specialized
diet, and poaching. These factors, combined with the fact that there
are fewer than one thousand pandas alive in the world, make the spe-
cies one of the most endangered. Thus, a truly viable population may
no longer exist in the wild today.
In addition to the wild pandas, approximately one hundred are
living in captivity in China and thirteen are permanently located in
zoos of other nations. 10 3 However, pandas have proven difficult to
breed in captivity. For example, the United States National Zoo in
Washington, D.C. has had difficulty in successfully breeding the two
pandas which it received as gifts in 1972.104 To date, five cubs have
either been stillborn or died shortly after birth. 105
2. Exhibition Loans
Pandas were occasionally used as diplomatic tokens, such as the
gift of two pandas to the National Zoo when relations between the
People's Republic of China and the United States thawed in the
97. Johnson, supra note 95, at 176.
98. Boffey, Traditional Allies Battle Over Pandas, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
99. TIME, May 23, 1988, at 33 (Int'l ed.).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. SCHALLER, Hu JINCHU, PAN WENSHI, ZHU JING, THE GIANT PANDAS OF WOLONG
178-206 (1985).
103. Id. at 265-66 (app. B).
104. Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, § A, at 3.
105. Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1989, § A, at 35.
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1970s. 106 However, in 1985, Chinese authorities decided to discon-
tinue the presentation of pandas as permanent gifts. 10 7 Current Chi-
nese policy still allows for short-term loans of pandas for exhibition.
Such loans typically involve the exhibition of two pandas for 100 to
200 days and have become very popular with American zoos. In
1988, pandas were exhibited at the Toledo Zoo and plans were made
for subsequent exhibitions in Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, Ohio;
Omaha, Nebraska; Portland, Oregon; at the Michigan State Fair; and
Disney World in Orlando, Florida. 08
China's willingness to exhibit the preciously few pandas despite
the potential danger to the species is partly economic. Deng Xiaop-
ing's economic reforms encourage government departments to supple-
ment their funding by creating profit making units. American zoos
typically pay China between $300,000 and $500,000 to exhibit a single
pair of pandas. 0 9 In addition, Chinese officials usually receive a free
trip to the United States to accompany the pandas. The host zoo gen-
erally pays for three Chinese animal handlers to stay with the pandas
during the exhibit, and for five Chinese officials to attend the opening
and closing ceremonies of the exhibit. "0 While the host zoos invaria-
bly stress the educational and conservation purposes of the exhibit,
their decision to exhibit the endangered species is obviously affected
by economic considerations. Pandas draw great public attention and
significantly boost zoo attendance and revenues."'
Critics of the short-term loans contend that these exhibits ham-
per captive breeding programs by disrupting the natural breeding cy-
cle of the animals. Evidence strongly suggests that mating between
pandas requires a concerted effort to find compatible mates and accli-
mate them to each other." 12 The cycle of international shipment and
repeated isolation at various zoos disrupts the breeding environment.
In 1987, concerns over the short-term loans became acute when a fe-
male panda on loan at the Bronx Zoo ovulated. As a result, in March
1988, the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums
106. Boffey, supra note 98.
107. TIME, supra note 99.
108. Boffey, supra note 98.
109. Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, § A, at 3.
110. TIME, supra note 99.
111. For example, the panda exhibit at the San Diego Zoo resulted in a 35% increase in
attendance and a revenue gain of more than five million dollars. Boffey, supra note 98.
112. Adult pandas are essentially solitary, even antisocial animals. In captivity, panda
couples have rarely been compatible. As a result, few of the females have conceived naturally
when physiologically able to do so. SCHALLER, supra note 102.
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("AAZPA") issued guidelines urging that zoos "only accept animals
for short-term loans which are adult specimens physiologically inca-
pable of reproduction."
'" 13
On May 23, 1988, the CITES Secretariat issued a notification to
member countries regarding short-term loans of pandas.II 4 The noti-
fication stated that "[e]xhibition loans [of pandas] may detract from
the breeding potential of the captive-breeding efforts in China and
may, therefore, be detrimental to the survival of the species."' 5 The
notification further recommended that such loans be limited "to the
individual specimens which are either too young or too old to breed,
or are for some other reason unsuitable for inclusion in the captive-
breeding programme."
'"l 6
3. The Toledo Zoo's "Pandamania"
Litigation resulted from the United States Secretary of the Inte-
rior's approval of the importation of two breeding-age pandas for ex-
hibition at the Toledo Zoo for a loan period of 100 to 200 days
starting in May 1988." i 7 The World Wildlife Fund, a conservation
group with 475,000 members in the United States, and the AAZPA
opposed the granting of the permit and filed suit to enjoin the loan." l8
The litigants argued that the permit violated both CITES and the
ESA. 119
The Toledo Zoo panda loan was in many ways typical of most
panda exchanges. The Toledo Zoo was to receive two pandas for 100
days to celebrate the city's 150th anniversary. 120 During the exhibi-
tion, the Toledo Zoo agreed not to attempt any scientific observation
or breeding efforts. In return, the People's Republic of China was to
receive a donation of equipment and vehicles for the research facilities
at the Wolong Panda Reserve.12' The Toledo Zoo viewed the ex-
113. Position Statement on Giant Pandas, Adopted as AAZPA Mandatory Standards,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ZOOLOGICAL PARKS AND AQUARIUMS (1988).
114. CITES, NOTIFICATION TO THE PARTIES ON GIANT PANDA EXHIBITION LOANS,
May 23, 1988 [hereinafter NOTIFICATION].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, § A, at 3.
118. World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, slip op. at 1, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C. 1988).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. This donation was to be equivalent to $300,000. Agreement For Loan of Giant Pan-
das Between China Wildlife Conservation Association and Toledo Zoological Society, Exhibit
"C" in Plaintiffs' Complaint, World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C. 1988).
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change as a means to increase revenue through increased attendance
and the sale of "pandamania" souvenirs.1 22 The zoo planned to use
the profits from the exhibition to finance needed capital improvements
for the zoo's primate display.
23
Unfortunately for the Toledo Zoo, the entire climate for panda
exhibitions had changed since the Bronx Zoo exhibit the previous
year. Conservation groups strongly opposed such loans, the
AAZPA's new policy disfavored such loans, and the Wildlife Service
refused to grant any import permits until the People's Republic of
China could demonstrate how such loans would help propagate the
species. The zoo, acting in good faith, had asked for nonbreeding-age
pandas and expended considerable funds in preparation for them. 124
Rather than cancel their plans, the zoo requested Delbert Latta, a
senior Republican Congressman from Ohio, to intercede on its behalf
with the Wildlife Service. 125 The zoo also sought assistance from the
Chinese government. 126 On May 6, 1988, the Wildlife Service issued a
permit authorizing importation of the pandas for the purposes set
forth in the Toledo Zoo application. 127 Thus, it came as quite a sur-
prise when the Chinese government provided two eight-year-old,
prime breeding-age pandas, one of which was a proven breeder in
captivity. 128
In 1983, when the People's Republic of China became a member
of CITES, the giant panda was listed in Appendix 111.129 In 1984, the
122. Toledo Blade, May 24, 1988, at 7.
123. The zoo denied that increased income derived from the panda exhibit would benefit
the zoo, explaining that the extra revenue would be used to cover the panda exhibition's ex-
penses. Id. However, in a planning meeting report, the zoo's intent was clearly illustrated:
The concept for these projects is to assign to the temporary Panda Exhibit all possi-
ble expenses that are necessary for the permanent Primate Exhibit. Additionally, all
efforts have and will be made to minimize cost for the items only usable for the
Panda. The advantages of this approach is [sic] to maximize the facility benefits for
the Panda Exhibit and minimize total costs.
See Affidavit of E.U. Curtis Bohlen, World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C.
1988).
124. Hodel, slip op. at 7.
125. See Boffey, supra note 98.
126. Secretary of Interior Hodel was quick to give credit to Representative Latta for inter-
vening on behalf of the Toledo Zoo. Toledo Blade, May 27, 1988, at 17.
127. Hodel, slip op. at 7.
128. There is a dispute as to whether the male panda, Le Le, had successfully fathered a
cub. The World Wildlife Fund alleged that Le Le had successfully bred, and may be the only
confirmed male breeder at the Wolong Reserve. See Affidavit of Christopher Elliott, World
Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C. 1988). However, Chinese officials have aggres-
sively denied the allegation. Toledo Blade, May 26, 1988, at 6.
129. See NOTIFICATION, supra note 114.
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convention transferred the giant panda to Appendix 1.130 The Wild-
life Service listed the panda as an endangered species under the ESA
on January 23, 1984.131 Therefore, a properly issued import permit
must meet the requirements of both CITES and the ESA.
Article III of the convention states that a signatory party may
grant an import permit for an Appendix I species only when: 1) the
Scientific Authority of the importing country has determined that the
import will be for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival
of the species involved; and 2) the Management Authority of the im-
porting country is satisfied that the importing facility will not use the
specimen primarily for commercial purposes.
13 2
In issuing the import permit to the Toledo Zoo, the Wildlife Ser-
vice found that the importation of two breeding-age pandas would not
threaten the species' survival.1 33 The service determined that male
pandas could be safely removed from their natural habitat because the
male panda's semen could be secured and artificially stored. As to the
female, the Scientific Authority noted, "[o]ne might conclude that the
Chinese consider this animal as non-reproductive since that is the
type of animal that the applicant requested," and that she might "be
past the breeding period for this year."'
' 34
Both of these conclusions are subject to harsh criticism. With
respect to the decision on the male panda, captive breeding efforts
with pandas have had a significantly higher success rate with natural
mating than artificial insemination. 135 Artificial insemination in en-
dangered species is usually a tool of last resort, and used only when
natural mating is no longer possible. The Wildlife Service's conclu-
sion is particularly troubling given that the only panda at the Wolong
Reserve to have fathered an offspring in captivity was the male sent to
130. 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1989).
131. 49 Fed. Reg. 2779 (1984) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)).
132. CITES, supra note 2, art. 111(3).
An import permit may only be granted when the following conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of Import has advised that the import will
be for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species involved.
(b) a Management Authority of the State of Import is satisfied that the speci-
men is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.
Id.
133. Boffey, supra note 98.
134. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19,
World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C. 1988).
135. Between 1978 and 1982, approximately 40 females were artificially inseminated with
only 11 subsequent births and 7 surviving cubs. SCHALLER, supra note 102, at 179.
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the Toledo Zoo.' 36 The removal of the only proven breeder from a
program for the propagation of the species clearly has an adverse ef-
fect on the success of that program.
The conclusion as to the female is even more questionable since it
was based on mere speculation that the female "may be past the
breeding period for th[e] year."' 137 Pandas reproduce in seasonal cy-
cles, with conceptions usually occurring between mid-March and
mid-May. 138 However, there have been reports of pandas having peri-
ods of estrus occurring as late as June. 139 Among females which fail
to conceive in the spring, estrus may occur as late as September or
October. 140 The Scientific Authority's report also ignored the adverse
effects that international travel and temporary relocation may have on
a species whose reproductive rate is particularly slow.
Contrary to the conclusions of the United States Scientific Au-
thority, it is clear that the short-term exhibition at the Toledo Zoo
had a negative impact on the propagation of the panda population.
The only possible justification for the Toledo loan was the economic
benefit to the Wolong Reserve. Arguably, the $300,000 worth of
equipment provided for China's conservation efforts at the reserve
from the Toledo loan outweighed the detriment of removing the two
animals from their breeding environment. There is little doubt that
the People's Republic of China needs assistance in its conservation
efforts; however, the zoo's assistance to the Wolong Reserve was of
questionable value. The World Wildlife Fund noted in its comment
on the Toledo Zoo's application that much of the zoo's assistance was
duplicative of work already in progress by the Fund and other conser-
vation organizations.1
41
For an import permit to be issued for an Appendix I species, it
must be shown "that the specimen is not to be used for primarily
136. Affidavit of Christopher Elliott at 4, World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276)
(D.D.C. 1988).
137. Brief for World Wildlife Fund and American Association of Zoological Parks and
Aquariums at 19, World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, (No. 88-1276) (D.D.C. 1988).
138. SCHALLER, supra note 102, at 178.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Id. at 178-79.
141. Comment by World Wildlife Fund on Permit Application PRT 726229 at 6, April 29,
1988 [hereinafter Permit Comment]. For example, the zoo promised to establish a joint team
with the Chinese to prepare a comprehensive ecological study of the Tanjiahe Reserve. How-
ever, such a study was already in process by a joint Chinese and World Wildlife Fund team.
Id.
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commercial purposes." 142 Under the convention, "an activity can
generally be described as 'commercial' if its purpose is to obtain eco-
nomic benefit, including profit (whether in cash or in kind) and is
directed toward resale, exchange, provision of a service or other forms
of economic use or benefit."1 43 In addition, the convention defines
''commercial purposes"
as broadly as possible so that any transaction which is not wholly
"non-commercial" will be regarded as "commercial." In transpos-
ing this principle to the term "primarily commercial purposes," it
is agreed that all uses whose non-commercial aspects do not clearly
predominate shall be considered to be primarily commercial in na-
ture with the result that the importation of Appendix I specimens
should not be permitted.44
The stated goal of the Toledo panda exhibition was to promote
education about wildlife. The not-for-profit status of the Toledo Zoo
further supports the argument against treating the exhibit as a com-
mercial enterprise. Nevertheless, there are unmistakable commercial
elements present in the Toledo Zoo loan agreement. First, the panda
loan was a commercial exchange for goods valued at $300,000. 145
Second, the zoo expected the increased revenues from the exhibition
to pay for $2,000,000 worth of capital improvements to their primate
exhibit. 146 Third, the zoo hoped the panda exhibit would substan-
tially increase its membership. 147 Finally, the zoo engaged in a sur-
prising degree of hucksterism 48 in its efforts to promote the panda.
Among other things, the zoo paid a public relations firm $350,000 to
advertise the pandas, set up cooperative deals with soft drink manu-
facturers and grocery store chains, and sent out mass mailings in an
attempt to hype "pandamania."'' 49 The zoo hoped to produce gross
revenues in excess of $3,000,000 through the exhibition-over ten
142. CITES, supra note 2, art. III(3)(c), (5)(c).
143. Id. art. 111(3).
144. CITES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PAR-
TIES res. 5.10 (1985) [hereinafter FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS].
145. Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, § A, at 3, col. 2.
146. Permit Comment, supra note 141.
147. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1989, § C, at 1, col. 4.
148. "Hucksterism" is defined as promotional activity which borders on zealous misrepre-
sentation. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 551 (1979).
149. The zoo's campaign included saturating Northwest Ohio with billboards, commercial
tie-ins with Pepsi-"Pandas and Pepsi! Save on a Great Combination"-and other businesses.
It became almost impossible to drive in Toledo without seeing a giant panda staring benignly
out at an urban landscape.
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times the amount sent to China for conservation purposes. 50 Balanc-
ing the purported educational objectives of the exhibit against these
commercial and economic benefits, it is clear that the commercial na-
ture of the loan predominates.
In addition to the CITES' limitations, the ESA further restricts
the issuance of permits for importation of endangered species. Under
the ESA, import permits may only be issued for scientific purposes or
to enhance the propagation or survival of the species.1 5' The Toledo
Zoo's panda exhibit could not have been for scientific purposes since
the zoo's agreement with the People's Republic of China forbade sci-
entific study or breeding.1 52 Furthermore, the exhibit did not enhance
the propagation or survival of the species. 5
3
The United States Department of the Interior also has regula-
tions which distinguish between special exhibitions of endangered spe-
cies and regular zoological displays.1 54  These regulations allow
importation for zoological displays of species that are merely
"threatened" but not listed as an endangered species. 55 However, if
the Department of the Interior meant to permit importation of endan-
gered species for "zoological exhibition," it would have clearly stated
this intent in the regulation.
The World Wildlife Fund's lawsuit to prevent the panda exhibit
at the Toledo Zoo was unsuccessful. 5 6 While they were successful in
stopping some of the more commercial aspects of the Toledo exhibi-
tion, the pandas were ultimately brought to the zoo.' 57 However, in a
broader sense, the suit was extraordinarily successful. The negative
publicity caused both the Wildlife Service and the People's Republic
of China to revise their policies on panda loans. 5 8 Additionally, zoos
150. Wash. Post, May 18, 1988, § A, at 3, col. 2.
151. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(A), 1539(a)(1)(A).
152. TIME, supra note 99.
153. Boffey, supra note 98.
154. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (1989).
155. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 with 50 C.F.R. § 17.32.
156. U.P.I., June 20, 1988.
157. United States District Court Judge Norma Johnson granted a preliminary injunction
barring the Toledo Zoo from charging visitors a special two dollar fee to view the giant panda
exhibit. Id.
158. On September 16, 1988, China announced that it would no longer loan giant pandas
or golden monkeys, another endangered species, to the United States. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1988, § 1, at 28, col. 1. The action followed a June 1988 decision by the Wildlife Service to
deny panda import applications from zoos or other institutions until it reviewed its panda loan
policies and guidelines. 53 Fed. Reg. 23,847 (1988).
In September 1989, the Wildlife Service announced its new policy. The policy incorpo-
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around the world were put on notice that future loans of this type
would be challenged.
B. The African Elephant
In 1986, only a single elephant was left alive in Burundi, 59 yet
the country registered over 100 tons of ivory which represented tusks
from 8,148 elephants.1 60 The central African nation of Burundi is a
tiny, densely populated country, which is periodically torn by violent
tribal struggles between the predominantly pastoral Tutsi and the
largely agrarian Hutu population. 61 For most of the 1980s, hunters
smuggled ivory from elephants slaughtered illegally in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda into Burundi and laundered the ivory with
false certificates of origin.1 62 The illegal ivory was then shipped to
European, Asian, and American markets. The smuggling of poached
ivory through Burundi was a small part of an immense world trade
supplying a voracious market for ivory jewelry and carvings.1 63 The
control and regulation of this trade has been the biggest challenge in
CITES' history.
1. The Poaching Problem
Ivory is not a mineral or precious stone; it can only be obtained
from the tusks of adult elephants. 164 For thousands of years,
rated all of the World Wildlife Fund's objections to temporary panda loans. It limited loans to
nonbreeding-age pandas even during the nonbreeding season unless the loans clearly supported
breeding opportunities. As a result, loans would be limited to females at least two years of age,
but not older than four; males at least two, but not older than five; and adults of either sex
eighteen years or older.
In addition, the service attempted to define the noncommercial requirement of such loans.
The proposed guidelines would require that the sponsor organization demonstrate that its
share of funds would further its stated nonprofit objectives. These objectives would contribute
primarily to the conservation of giant pandas and secondarily to other endangered species or
natural resources.
The Toledo loan, evaluated under these guidelines, would fail because the pandas were
both of prime breeding age. On the other hand, the proposed guidelines accept the commer-
cialization of panda loans as long as they benefit the objectives of the nonprofit organization.
In effect, this was what the Toledo Zoo intended to do with the increased funds from the panda
exhibit.
159. Saving The Elephant, The Economist, July 1, 1989, at 15.
160. 53 Fed. Reg. 15,468 (1989).
161. See generally A Crisis in East Africa: New Census Shows that Poaching has Taken
Heavy Toll, L.A. Times, Apr. 4, 1988, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter Crisis in East Africa].
162. See id.; N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986, § C, at 4, col. 5.
163. See generally D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at 136.
164. See Weisburd, African Elephants: A Dying Way of Life, Sci. News, May 21, 1988, at
333.
256 [Vol. 13:231
Convention on Endangered Species
craftsmen have used ivory for carving figurines and making jewelry.
Ivory from African elephants is generally preferred over that of Asian
elephants because the African tusks are more dense and provide a
higher quality carving material. 65 Trade in African ivory dates back
to Roman times. However, systematic ivory exploitation did not be-
gin until the seventeenth century when the Portuguese colonized West
Africa. Exploitation in the nineteenth century was so severe that it
brought the elephant population in East and Central Africa to the
edge of extinction. In 1897, game laws were introduced which re-
stricted elephant hunting and allowed surviving elephants to reestab-
lish their prior population levels. 166 Unfortunately, the elephant
population in Africa began to decline again in the 1970s.167 Evidence
indicates that an explosion in poaching was the primary cause of the
population decline. ' 68 Today, the African elephant is again a severely
endangered species.
For some years, biologists and wildlife experts have noted local
declines in the elephant populations of various national parks and
protected areas. 69 Yet, it was not until 1987 that a demographic
study showing elephant population trends in Africa became avail-
able. 170 Wildlife experts assembled the best available data on elephant
populations in a United Nations Environmental Programme
("UNEP") report sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund and Elsa
165. The Asian elephant (elephas maximus) is also threatened with extinction and listed
on Appendix I. Approximately 24,000 wild Asiatic elephants are scattered in forests and
grasslands of India, Sri Lanka, Indochina, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South China. Although
the Asiatic elephant faces habitat destruction and poaching, it does not seem to have suffered
the population crash of the African elephant. This is partly due to the fact that the Asiatic
elephant has value as a domesticated work animal. For thousands of years these elephants
have been taken from the wild, trained, and put to work in logging, farming, construction,
hunting, and warfare. In contrast, the African elephant has not been widely domesticated. See
generally Schmidt, The Fine Art of Elephant Breeding, ANIMAL KINGDOM 45 (1989).
Another possible reason why poaching has not created a crisis for the Asiatic elephant is
its common lack of tusks. In Africa, most elephants, both male and female have tusks. How-
ever, in Asia, perhaps due to the selective hunting for ivory over thousands of years, female
elephants only rarely have tusks and males frequently have none.
166. Spinage, A Review of Ivory Exploitation and Elephant Population Trends in Africa, 11
E. AFR. WILDLIFE J. 281-89 (1973).
167. Fin. Times, June 23, 1990, § I, at 6.
168. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, § A, at 5, col. 1.
169. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, § 6, at 28, col. 1.
170. The 1987 elephant census was conducted by elephant specialist Ian Douglas-Hamil-
ton and funded by the European Economic Community and the World Wildlife Fund. See
Crisis in East Africa, supra note 161.
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Wild Animal Appeal. 17, The report presented estimates of elephant
populations for Africa, country by country, using the geographical
information provided by the UNEP. 172 The results exposed an alarm-
ing population decline over the last ten to fifteen years. 173 From an
estimated continent-wide elephant population of 1,300,000 in 1979,
there had been a decrease to between 600,000 and 800,000 by 1986.174
The census further revealed a decrease of 87% or more in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda during the previous fifteen years. 75 In Sudan,
Chad, the Central African Republic, and Zaire, poaching had virtu-
ally wiped out this magnificent animal. 76 Sudan, for example, ex-
ported 1,200 tons of ivory from 1979 to 1982, representing the deaths
of 107,000 elephants or 80% of the estimated population.
177
Researchers fear that the impact of poaching is far greater than
the sheer decrease in the number of elephants. As Cynthia Moss has
described in her popular book, Elephant Memories,178 elephants have
an intricate social hierarchy and structure. They live in family units
consisting of adult females and their immature offspring ranging from
newborns to calves up to about ten years old. 179 A matriarch, usually
the oldest female, is the leader of each family unit. 80 Females reach
sexual maturity at about eleven years of age, but are most productive
after twenty-five years.
The destruction of the elephant population has followed a
methodical pattern. Poachers, seeking the animals with the largest
tusks, first hunt the males and the older matriarchs.181 When the sup-
ply of older elephants is exhausted, the poachers hunt the medium
aged ones, including prime breeding-age females. 182 Eventually, the
populations are reduced to only young elephants with very small
tusks. This regression has two significant effects. First, poachers
171. A summary of the report is available in Douglas-Hamilton, African Elephants: Popu-
lation Trends and Their Causes, 21 ORYX 11 (1987).
172. See Crisis in East Africa, supra note 161.
173. Id.
174. E.g., Lindsay, Trading Elephants for Ivory, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 6, 1986, at 48;
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, § 6, at 28, col. 1.
175. See Crisis in East Africa, supra note 161.
176. Caldwell, Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit, 6 TRAFFIC BULL. 19-20 (1988).
177. Crisis in East Africa, supra note 161.
178. C. Moss, ELEPHANT MEMORIES: THIRTEEN YEARS IN THE LIFE OF AN ELEPHANT
FAMILY 295 (1988).
179. Id.
180. Weisburd, supra note 164, at 333.
181. C. Moss, supra note 178.
182. Id.
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must kill increasingly more elephants to supply the demand for ivory,
since each individual elephant is supplying less. Second, the social
structure of the herds is deprived of its leadership and prime breeding
elephants. 8 3 Harassed by poachers, and having lost the collective ex-
perience of their mature members, the terrified, leaderless herds of
young elephants inevitably experience a reduced reproduction rate.
There is little doubt that increased ivory poaching is the primary
cause of the elephant population decrease. In the 1960s, most conser-
vationists considered the chief threat to elephants to be habitat de-
struction due to agricultural expansion. Herds were so strong and
numerous that Kenya instituted controlled culling programs. By
1980, however, researchers found more carcasses than live animals;
invariably the tusks had been cut out of the dead animals. The reason
for the slaughters was obvious, the price of ivory had risen to the
point where poaching had become extremely profitable. In the late
1960s, the price of ivory was approximately $5 per kilogram.8 4 By
1972, it reached $30 per kilogram; in 1978, $75 per kilogram; and in
the mid-1980s, the price soared to over $100 per kilogram. 8 5 In con-
stant dollars, the price of ivory had increased three-and-one-half times
since the late 1960s. 186
The contraband ivory supplied vigorous ivory carving markets in
Africa and traditional carving centers such as Hong Kong and Ja-
pan. 87 Estimates show that Japan is the largest market for raw and
finished ivory and consumes as much as 40% of the ivory originating
in Africa.'8 8 Researchers estimate the world demand for ivory at 800
tons annually. 89 To meet this demand, approximately 70,000 ele-
phants per year would have to be slaughtered. 90 If the current popu-
183. Id. For the social life of elephants, see ELTRINGHAM, ELEPHANTS 52-57 (1988).
Reportedly, surveys in some parts of Africa have found no elephants older than 30. Weisburd,
supra note 164.
184. L.A. Times, Apr. 4, 1988, at 5, col. 1 (1970 price of ivory was $7.44 per kilogram).
185. Id.
186. Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 171, at 19.
187. Fin. Times, June 23, 1990, § I, at 6.
188. Japan imported as much as 470 tons of ivory per year for use as family seals, chop-
sticks, and carvings. The ivory carving industry employed about 30,000 people. Id.
189. Caldwell, Recent Developments in the Raw Ivory Trade of Hong Kong and Japan, 6
TRAFFIC BULL. 16 (1984).
190. This assumes an average of 1.8 tusks per elephant to take into account one-tusked
and broken-tusked elephants and assumes an average tusk weight of 13 pounds. Douglas-
Hamilton, supra note 171, at 22. Another factor which should be considered is the death of
calves who have lost their mothers and the lower survivability rate of a herd which has lost its
most senior members.
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lation estimates of 600,000 to 800,000 elephants left in the wild are
correct, the population would decline by 9% to 11% per year due to
ivory hunting alone. Since elephants only increase their numbers by
3% to 7% per year under ideal conditions, 191 the net annual loss to
the species is critical. 19
2
Along with the increasing price of ivory, the increased availabil-
ity of automatic weapons has accelerated poaching. 193 Hunting ele-
phants with bows and arrows or even elephant guns is a dangerous
and difficult activity. This element of danger has worked to protect
the animals from all but the famous "white hunter" safaris and the
most skilled African hunters. However, the proliferation of automatic
weapons has enabled a greater number of native hunters to supple-
ment their income by poaching. Even a 12,000 pound elephant will
fall prey to an AK 47 assault rifle.
2. CITES' Attempts to Save the Elephant
The African elephant has been listed on Appendix II of CITES
since the first draft of the convention.1 94 As a result, a CITES permit
or certificate from the country of export or reexport was necessary for
ivory to be traded among signatory countries. 195 Laundering opera-
tions and corrtipt law enforcement in many African countries pre-
vented this mechanism from effectively controlling the rapidly
expanding ivory trade.
1 96
In 1981, conscious of the increase in ivory trade and the failure
of the permit process, the Third Conference of the Parties to CITES
met in New Delhi and issued a resolution that recommended the par-
ties adopt additional restrictions on trade in ivory.197 The new ap-
proach required each tusk or piece of raw ivory to be marked using
punch dies to indicate the country of origin, the year the hunter ac-
quired the ivory, and the weight of the ivory in kilograms.198 The
convention encouraged the parties to accept only raw ivory which was
clearly marked, and to import, export, or reexport ivory only when
191. A number of factors including food supply, density, and the age of the population
affect the rate of reproduction. The 3% to 7% annual growth figure may be optimistic; it has
only been documented in one protected park. Lindsay, supra note 174.
192. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, § A, at 5, col. 1.
193. Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 171, at 19.
194. D. FAVRE, supra note 14.
195. CITES, supra note 2, art. IV(2).
196. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1989, at 14.
197. THIRD CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 61.
198. Id.
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satisfied that the ivory was legally acquired in the designated country
of origin. This last point was more advisory than practical consider-
ing the sophistication of the ivory smuggling and laundering
operations.
Unfortunately, the new CITES system provided little improve-
ment. The regulation of carved ivory depended completely upon the
effectiveness of enforcement in countries where exporting and carving
took place. In practice, hunters would illegally take the ivory from
countries that had effective export controls like Kenya and Tanzania,
and smuggle it into countries like Burundi where ivory was punched
with the national markings of Burundi or Uganda. The ivory was
then exported to Hong Kong for carving and finally reexported to
Japan or the United States. At this point, it was clear to the CITES
member countries that little progress could be made without stronger
controls and enforcement throughout Africa.
At the Fifth Conference of the Parties to CITES held in 1985,
the signatory countries attempted for the third time to improve regu-
lation of the trade in ivory.199 Substantial changes were made in an
attempt to create a more centralized regulatory structure. The con-
vention delegated to the CITES Secretariat the authority to form an
Ivory Control Unit and to establish ivory quota procedures to regu-
late trade between CITES member and nonmember countries. 2°° The
1986 quota of ivory permitted to be exported was deliberately set high
at 90,000 tusks, taking into account stockpiled tusks and those confis-
cated from poachers. 20 1 The conference anticipated that the quotas
would be reduced when the backlog of tusks was eliminated. 20 2
This new system appeared to be more successful than the previ-
ous attempts to regulate ivory trade. The Ivory Control Unit estab-
lished an objective watchdog, which had been noticeably absent in
prior years. Export quotas for the African countries provided clear
guidelines which the authorities could carefully monitor. By tracking
the die-punched ivory, the authorities could quickly identify problem
areas and apply political and economic pressure. 20 3
199. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 54-56.
200. Id. at 55.
201. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986, § C, at 4, col. 5; but see The Economist, July 1, 1989, at
12 (the figure is estimated at 108,000 tusks).
202. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986, § C, at 4, col. 5.
203. For example, on April 29, 1988, the United States banned the importation of ivory
from Burundi that was not registered with the CITES Secretariat. Furthermore, the United
States banned all ivory importations, both worked and unworked, from any country that al-
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Despite high hopes, the 1986 quota system failed just as its two
predecessors. Even though high quotas were established to draw
stockpiles of illegal ivory into the officially regulated system, most
traders preferred to smuggle the ivory rather than bother with the
paperwork to obtain a quota authorization.
By the spring of 1989, it was clear that a regulated market in
ivory was simply not effective and that a complete ban on ivory was
the only viable option to save the elephant. In May of that year,
Kenya and Tanzania called for a worldwide ban on the trade of ivory
after a drastic decline in the elephant population. 2°4 The nations
feared that the continued slaughter would discourage tourism, which
provided a substantial source of income. 205 Immediately after the an-
nouncement, France responded by banning the importation of
ivory. 20 6 Shortly thereafter, the United States followed with a tempo-
rary ban on imports until the CITES conference in October could
address the matter. 20 7 More importantly, Japan announced that it
would ban all imports of carved ivory and allow only raw ivory,
which came directly from African producer countries, accompanied
by proper documentation.2 0
8
As a result of the call for a complete ban on ivory trade, a split
between the African nations developed. East African countries, such
as Kenya and Tanzania, facing an elephant population crash favored
the ban, while the southern African nations, including Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Botswana, and South Africa disapproved of it. 209 These
southern nations did not have a significant poaching problem and
used profits from the sale of ivory to finance their elephant conserva-
tion efforts.2
10
In October 1989, at the Seventh Conference of the Parties to
CITES, attending nations instigated a two-year moratorium on the
sale of ivory by a vote of seventy-six to eleven, with four absten-
lowed importation of nonregistered Burundi ivory into that country. 53 Fed. Reg. 15,468
(1989).
204. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1989, § A, at 5, col. 1.
205. Id.; The Economist, July 1, 1989, at 15.
206. In 1988 alone, France imported three million dollars worth of carved ivory and four
tons of uncarved ivory. Daily Telegraph (London), June 6, 1989, int'l sec., at 10.
207. 54 Fed. Reg. 24,758 (1989).
208. The Economist, July 1, 1989, at 16.
209. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1989, § C, at 14.
210. Id.
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tions.211 Five African nations, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique,
Malawi, and Burundi, immediately announced their intention to con-
tinue the ivory trade despite the ban. 212 These countries which voted
against the ban have relatively small elephant populations, and conse-
quently, no serious poaching problem. 213 They resisted a complete
prohibition, in part, because of their success in financing conservation
efforts through the sale of ivory.214 These countries have tried to pre-
serve the elephant population by giving it economic value. Under
their conservation plan, a certain number of elephants are killed each
year and the profits from the sale of the ivory are distributed to the
people living in rural areas. 215 This provides incentives to those peo-
ple living near and around the elephants to protect them as an eco-
nomic resource.
Despite their resistance, the ban will be successful if the United
States, Western Europe, and particularly Japan strictly enforce it and
drive down the demand for ivory. Although still in its early stages,
the ban appears to be working. The price for poached ivory report-
edly decreased by 95% within months of the ban's institution.216 This
was apparently a direct result of the closing of ivory factories in Hong
Kong, China, and Japan. Thus, the closing of the Asian market
caused ivory prices to collapse, and with them, the incentive to
poach. 217 If the lack of incentive causes poaching to subside, then in a
few years, a sustained yield of ivory through managed harvesting may
be possible.
Critics of the ban fear that it will eventually encourage rather
than discourage poaching.218 They fear that as existing stocks of
211. CITES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE
PARTIES (1989).
212. Fin. Times, June 23, 1990, § I, at 6.
213. See generally Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1989, § C, at 14. "Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Malawi, Namibia and South Africa have shown that a combination of controlled hunting--
geared to keeping the herds at optimum strength-and vigorous enforcement of anti-poaching
laws works much better [than a complete ban]." Id.
214. Simmons, Endangered Species Protection, in HERITAGE FDN. REP., April 19, 1990, at
18.
215. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1989, § C, at 14. According to range scientists, "[tihe
answer is to channel earnings from tightly controlled legal hunting and legal products into the
villages in elephant country, and to compensate farmers for the inevitable damage to their
fields from these wild animals." Id.; see also Simmons, supra note 214, at 18.
216. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1989, § C, at 14.
217. Id.; Leakey, supra note 38, at 13.
218. Simmons, supra note 214, at 18; Huxley, Lies, Damned Lies and Population Figures,
The Independent, June 30, 1990, at 13.
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ivory decline, the price will be driven up and provide an incentive for
increased poaching. However, this argument is flawed since it consid-
ers a small black market in ivory to be as grave a threat as a huge
legitimate market. This is simply untrue, because it was the large le-
gitimate demand for ivory in Japan and Hong Kong that originally
threatened the elephant population. In contrast, a small black market
with reduced demand may revive some poaching, but it poses a far
less significant threat to the elephant species than that faced earlier.
In theory, the ivory producing nations of Africa have a financial
interest in bringing ivory production within the sphere of legal com-
merce. This would shift profits from illegal hunters and brokers back
into the local economy. Eventually, a regulated system of culling ele-
phant herds of excess numbers could produce a sustainable supply of
ivory, providing local employment and tax revenue. However, it must
be kept in mind that ivory is relatively economically insignificant for
African countries-total exports in raw ivory amount to only 0.2% of
Africa's merchandise exports.219
Unfortunately, the theory of controlled ivory trade presents
problems for countries with weak governmental structures. The lack
of a strong central government makes control of the ivory trade diffi-
cult. In the past, much of the ivory trade was facilitated by corrupt
civil servants and politicians, who were drawn by the immense poten-
tial profits.
Furthermore, the cost-benefit advantage of controlled ivory trade
may not be entirely persuasive. A conflict still exists for the individ-
ual hunter between long-term and short-term gains. Many will opt
for a high profit in the short term, rather than settle for a lower, sus-
tainable return. A sustainable rate of ivory hunting may be as little as
the rate of elephant reproduction, between 3% and 7% per year.
220
Unless governmental controls are strictly enforced, poachers and
ivory traders may not be inclined to give up those high profits in ex-
change for some distant and indirect benefit to themselves and the
nation as a whole.
219. The Economist, July 1, 1989, at 16.
220. Some experts have argued that the highest sustainable rate of harvesting ivory occurs
through natural mortality rather than through random or even selective hunting. See Pilgram
& Western, Managing African Elephants for Ivory Production Through Ivory Trade Regula-
tions, 23 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 515, 527 (1986).
[Vol. 13:231
Convention on Endangered Species
C. Sea Turtles
Unlike pandas and elephants, it is difficult to estimate the impact
of trade on sea turtles. Sea turtles are inherently difficult to study,
spending most of their lives at sea. They are threatened by develop-
ment of the sandy beaches, maritime pollution, and hunting. 221 There
are seven generally recognized species of sea turtle: Hawksbill, Leath-
erback, Kemp's (Atlantic) Ridley, Olive (Pacific) Ridley, Loggerhead,
and two species of Green Turtle (Chelonia mydas and Chelonia
depressa).222
1. Characteristics of the Species
The life of one species of sea turtle, the Olive Ridley, is represen-
tative of most turtle species.223 A full grown Olive Ridley weighs ap-
proximately eighty pounds, has a shell the size of a manhole cover,
and is found in the warmer waters of the Pacific Ocean from southern
Japan to Baja, California.224 Like other sea turtles, the Olive Ridley
spends most of its life at sea.225 Females are particularly vulnerable to
hunters when they come ashore to nest in the sand. They come to the
beaches in spectacular concentrations, known as arribazons, to lay
their eggs. Adapted for life at sea, they move laboriously on land,
struggling to get to a nesting site above the tide line. Once a female
turtle finds a safe place, she digs a hole with her back flippers and lays
approximately one hundred eggs, each the size of a ping pong ball.226
She then gently covers them with sand and attempts to return to the
sea. At this point, the female turtles are most vulnerable, and hunters
slaughter them as they nest. 227 Awkward and slow out of water, they
are easily caught and flipped over on their backs. Hunters are also
221. See generally Ehrenfeld, Options and Limitations in the Conservation of Sea Turtles,
in BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF SEA TURTLES 457 (Bjorndal ed. 1981).
222. Marine turtles are traditionally divided into two families, Dermochelyidae (Leather-
back) and Cheloniidae (Green Turtle, Loggerhead, Hawksbill, Atlantic Ridley, and Pacific
Ridley). However, all seven species share a common ancestor and show remarkably similar
behavior in nesting. Carr, Notes on the Behavioral Ecology of Sea Turtles, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE WORLD CONFERENCE IN SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION 19 (1979).
223. See generally A. CARR, THE SEA TURTLE So EXCELLENT A FISHE (1986); see also
A. CARR, HANDBOOK OF TURTLES: THE TURTLES OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND
BAJA CALIFORNIA 347-410 (1952) (for a description of the life cycle of sea turtles).
224. A. CARR, HANDBOOK OF TURTLES, supra note 223, at 403-06.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 408-10.
227. The Independent, Mar. 4, 1990, at 12 (for a description of the slaughter).
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known to collect nearly all the eggs by following the tracks the female
has left from the nest on her way back to the ocean.
The eggs that survive the hunters will incubate for 45 to 60 days
before the hatchlings thrash through a meter or so of sand to the sur-
face. 2 2 8 When they have reached the surface of the beach, each hatch-
ling separately faces the problem of finding the sea. There has been
no adequate explanation of how the hatchlings determine what direc-
tion to take, but current theories emphasize the role of moon or sun
light reflecting off the water in drawing the hatchlings to the water.229
Once they reach the water, the next stage in the young quarter-
sized turtle's life is a short, violent encounter with the surf.230 For the
next four years, the turtle will develop and mature as it learns to sur-
vive in the ocean. Female turtles will eventually return to the same
beach from which they originated in order to begin the nesting pro-
cess again. Turtles are relatively safe from systematic hunting while
at sea. However, they are frequently entangled in fishing nets, thus
providing a small reward to a fisherman who may eat the meat and
sell the shell.
All seven species of sea turtles are listed on Appendix I of
CITES. 231 International trade has particularly exploited the popula-
tion of three species in great numbers: Hawksbills for their shell;
232
Olive Ridleys for their skin and eggs;233 and Green Turtles for their
shell, skin, meat, and calipee. 234 However, extensive trade of these
three species continues despite their CITES listing because four party
nations, Japan, France, Italy, and Suriname, have taken reservations
on sea turtles.235 By entering a reservation to a species under Article
XXIII, a party is not bound to the species' trade restrictions.
236
228. A. CARR, HANDBOOK OF TURTLES, supra note 223, at 21.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 21-22.
231. 50 C.F.R. § 23.23 (1989).
232. A. CARR, HANDBOOK OF TURTLES, supra note 223, at 380.
233. Id. at 410.
234. Id. at 353.
235. France and Italy subsequently withdrew their reservations after the European Eco-
nomic Community adopted a common wildlife trade policy. Thomsen & Brautigam, CITES in
the European Economic Community: Who Benefits?, 5 B.U. INT'L L. J. 269, 275 (1987). The
reservations by Japan and Suriname remain in effect. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 144, at 271.
236. CITES, supra note 2, art. XXIII.
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2. The Japanese Consumer Market
Japan is by far the world's largest consumer of sea turtles and sea
turtle products. 237 Since 1970, over two million Hawksbill, Green
Ridley, and Olive Ridley sea turtles have been killed for the Japanese
turtle trade.238 The Japanese leather industry utilizes large quantities
of Green and Olive Ridley sea turtle skins to manufacture a variety of
leather products. Some sea turtles are stuffed and sold as decorations.
In addition, a small market exists for turtle meat and eggs. 239
However, the largest portion of the Japanese sea turtle trade con-
sists of trade in Hawksbill shell for the bekko industry. Bekko is a
300-year-old Japanese craft which uses the Hawksbill shell to deco-
rate such articles as women's hair ornaments and combs. 240 Skilled
craftsmen shape the scuts, hooves, and belly pieces of the turtle shell,
blending its natural colors with a combination of heat, water, and
pressure. 241 Designs are delicately carved into the desired shape and
each item is buffed and polished. 242 The result is a beautiful piece of
jewelry.
Japanese trade in sea turtles is an example of an inherent weak-
ness of CITES. Theoretically, an Appendix I species should not be
exported from its country of origin.243 However, in practice, the draw
of a market the size of Japan tempts many third world countries, such
as Indonesia, Panama, Cuba, Singapore, and the Philippines, to ex-
port the sea turtles to Japan.244 CITES can only function when both
the importing and exporting countries are actively enforcing its provi-
sions. When a consuming country fails to protect a species, the de-
mand invariably finds a supply.
Japan's reservations on sea turtles allow Japan to import sea tur-
tle products banned by CITES. 24 However, Resolution 4.25 requires
that any import from a CITES party that does not hold a reservation
237. Comment, Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Con vention: Reservations
Regarding the Reservation Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 444 (1981).
238. Milliken & Tokunaga, The Japanese Turtle Trade: 1970-1986, TRAFFIC BULL. 149
(1987) (Japan's report to the Center For Environmental Education).
239. See generally Reichart, Farming and Ranching as a Strategyfor Sea Turtle Conserva-
tion, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION 468
(1979).
240. See A. CARR, HANDBOOK OF TURTLES, supra note 223, at 380.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See generally FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 49 (conf. 5.10).
244. Id. at 58-98.
245. Milliken & Tokunaga, supra note 238, at 3.
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must be accompanied by a legal CITES export permit. 246 The confer-
ence committee also recommended that the documentation require-
ments be followed even when a party holds a reservation. 247
However, Japan has not implemented any procedures for verifying
whether there are valid permits from the exporting nation.248 Because
of the free entry of sea turtle products into Japan, and Japan's laxity
in inspecting for permits, hunters routinely bypass the exporting na-
tion's CITES regulations.
Prior to Japan's 1980 ratification of CITES, the country im-
ported approximately forty tons of Hawksbill shell annually. 249 As a
concession to the Appendix I listing of the Hawksbill, the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry voluntarily imposed a
thirty-ton import restriction on Hawksbill turtles.250 This translates
into approximately 28,000 Hawksbills per year.251 However, this pos-
itive limitation on imports illustrates a basic misunderstanding about
sea turtle behavior. Sea turtles usually live in discrete populations.
252
For example, Hawksbills from the Indonesian coast do not routinely
reproduce with the population around the Seychelles. Japan's
voracious market can easily wipe out an entire local population.
Thus, the thirty-ton restriction simply fails to protect individual sea
turtle populations.
As with ivory, CITES has failed to adequately protect sea turtles
because the voracious market simply overwhelms CITES' ability to
regulate trade. Japan's reservation allows their enormous consumer
market for sea turtles to thwart the efforts of Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and other supply nations to protect the species. Most sea turtle
habitats are located near less developed countries. Conservation of
wildlife is not the primary concern of the people of these countries.
246. FOURTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 81.
247. Milliken & Tokunaga, supra note 238, at 3.
248. Id.
249. See Sea Turtles in Trade and Evaluation, SEA TURTLE RESCUE FUND CENTER FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 3.
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id.
252. Scientific studies of tagged sea turtles indicate that adults return to the same beach
area where they hatched. Since mating occurs in the waters off the beach prior to and during
the nesting season, it seems there is very little cross-breeding between the discrete populations
which are tied to their nesting sites. As a result, if the population of one nesting area is wiped
out, it is unlikely that an area can be repopulated by other sea turtles without human
assistance.
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They are far more interested in the exploitation of any ready resource
which can provide income.
3. Ranching and Farming for Commercial Trade
Despite the significant ramifications of Japan's sea turtle reserva-
tion, CITES' attention to the sea turtle trade has recently focused in-
stead on CITES' exemptions for commercial trade in captively bred
turtles.253 The prospect of ranching or farming an endangered species
is attractive to both environmentalists and commercial traders. 254 In
1981, the Third Conference of the Parties to CITES created a second
type of exception for "ranching. ' 255 Ranching is the rearing in a con-
trolled environment of specimens taken from the wild.256 Proposals
to transfer a population to Appendix II for ranching purposes must
satisfy two general criteria: first, the ranch must promote the conser-
vation of the local population; and second, the ranch must adequately
identify and document the products of the operation to distinguish
them from illegal products. 257 At the Fifth Conference in Buenos
Aires in 1985, the parties adopted detailed marking standards for
identification of ranched specimens.258
Ranching operations promote conservation by collecting the eggs
or the young of a species having high hatchling mortality rates and
raising them in a protected environment. 259 For example, sea turtles
are especially vulnerable to hungry fish after they first enter the sea
after hatching. Of the hundreds of sea turtle eggs laid, only a few
survive to breeding age.260 However, if the eggs are removed from the
nest and hatched in an incubator, almost all of them can survive to
maturity. 261 If some are released and others processed for trade, the
net result will be an increase in the population of the species.
Additionally, breeding species in captivity can ease the pressure
on the wild species by providing a market supply. If costs are kept
down, the captively bred animals will undercut the price of hunted
253. See generally FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144.
254. Reichart, supra note 239, at 465-66.
255. THIRD CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 65.
256. Id.
257. D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at 208.
258. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 66.
259. D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at 206.
260. Id.; Reichart, supra note 239, at 469 ("It is a reasonable ... estimate that under
natural conditions 1 out of every 100 eggs laid will become a turtle . .
261. D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at 206.
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animals and may eventually put poachers out of business.262 Article
VIII, paragraph 4 of CITES states that animal species listed in Ap-
pendix I that have been bred in captivity for commercial purposes are
to be treated as if they were in Appendix 11.263 Thus, the convention
allows trade in captively bred animals, if a proper export permit is
obtained. In 1979, the Second Conference of the Parties to CITES in
San Jose established three conditions for captive breeding of Appen-
dix I species. The stock of captively bred animals should be: i) estab-
lished in a manner not detrimental to the survival of the species in the
wild; ii) maintained without augmentation from the wild; and iii)
managed in a manner designed to maintain the breeding stock indefi-
nitely.264 A subsequent CITES resolution requires any captive breed-
ing operation to be registered with the CITES Secretariat. 265
The captive breeding exception differs from the ranching excep-
tion in that a ranching operation must continuously replenish from
the wild, while a "farming" or captive breeding operation establishes
breeding stock independent of the wild. 266 If a farming operation es-
tablishes a self-sustaining population, it is likely to obtain an exemp-
tion from the CITES' limitations.267 However, to obtain a similar
exemption, ranching operations must demonstrate how they benefit
the wild population despite their takings from the wild to supply the
ranch.26
8
Proposals to exempt ranched turtles, in Suriname and the Reun-
ion Islands, and farmed turtles in the Cayman Islands have not met
with success. 269 In 1968, the Cayman Islands Turtle Farm attempted
to farm Green Turtles.270 Between 1968 and 1978, the farm devel-
oped an initial breeding stock by capturing a first generation of adult
turtles in the wild along with their eggs to be hatched and raised.
From this first generation of specimens, the farm planned to create a
262. See id.
263. CITES, supra note 2, art. VIII.
264. SECOND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 55, at 49.
265. FOURTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 54, at 63.
266. D. FAVRE, supra note 14, at 205.
267. See id. at 190.
268. Id. at 207.
269. Petitions for ranching exceptions by Suriname, France (for the Reunion Islands), and
the United Kingdom (for the Cayman Islands) were rejected after considerable debate at the
1985 meeting in Buenos Aires. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 129-34.
The rejection should not be interpreted as hostility to ranching, as an Australian proposal for
its population of Crocodylus porosus (crocodiles) was accepted at the same meeting. Id. at 136.
270. S. LYSTER, supra note 14, at 260.
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permanent breeding population. The farm planned to hatch and raise
a third generation of turtles to three or four years of age, at which
time they would be slaughtered for their meat, skin, and shell. How-
ever, for reasons that are unclear, the second generation turtles failed
to breed effectively. 271 Consequently, the farm was forced to rely on
its initial stock of first generation turtles to provide hatchlings for the
farm to raise for slaughter. The Cayman Islands Farm argued that
because it had not taken eggs or adults from the wild since 1978, it
was self-sustaining and thus entitled to an exemption under Article
III of CITES.2 7 2 However, it is clear that the farm cannot be in-
dependent of the wild until subsequent generations of turtles become
breeders as well.
Another problem faced by the Cayman Islands Farm was that of
effectively marking its turtle products to distinguish them from illegal
products. The current mixture of legal and illegal products on the
market makes enforcement extremely difficult. This mixing of prod-
ucts destroys the consumer's presumption that a can of turtle soup on
the grocery shelf or a turtle shell comb in a boutique is legal. The
solution to this problem may be to require that documentation ac-
company turtle meats, and that turtle shells have similar documenta-
tion or physical markings. However, these additional steps may
further burden enforcement by increasing the level of inspection.
Also, enforcement could be thwarted by illegal turtle products being
masqueraded as legitimate imports.
Perhaps the most important question regarding farms and
ranches is whether they actually benefit the wild population. The
principal argument made in support of granting exemptions for
ranched and farmed turtle products is that such trade will dampen the
demand for wild products and relieve pressure on wild populations.
273
However, two untested presumptions underlie this argument. First,
the argument presumes that the market for sea turtle products is fixed
and will not expand as supply increases. Second, it presumes that
trade in farmed products will not stimulate greater demand for turtle
products which it will not be able to supply. Therefore, the argument
271. Sea Turtles in Trade, supra note 249, at 29-35. However, the CITES' audit team put
a much more optimistic light on the question by noting that the captive turtles seemed to be
thriving and the second generation could be reproducing in a number of years. FIFTH CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 482-89. One of the problems associated with farm-
ing or ranching sea turtles is the long maturation process.
272. See FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 132.
273. Reichart, supra note 239, at 466.
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is unpersuasive unless it can be demonstrated that the farmed prod-
ucts will displace the illegal trade.
Thus, the failure of the Cayman Islands Turtle Farm to create a
self-sustaining population and the inability of the ranching operations
to show a benefit to the species or to develop an effective identification
scheme has kept CITES from granting any exemptions.
The farming of sea turtles is representative of CITES' ineffective-
ness in addressing the tension between the economic pressure for
trade and the importance of conserving a species. For example, the
Cayman Islands, a dependency of the United Kingdom, has been ad-
versely affected by its failure to get an exemption. The turtle farm
was subsidized by the government with the hope of creating an indige-
nous industry which could produce jobs and provide exports. 2 7 4 With
an economy oriented toward tourism and offshore financial services,
turtle products were the island's only potential export. Prior to the
turtle's listing in 1979, ninety islanders were employed by the farm.
While the permanent loss of ninety jobs may seem minor in a large
economy, it was extremely damaging to a small economy striving for
self-sufficiency.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF CITES
A. Compliance and Enforcement
Like most international agreements, CITES has inherent en-
forcement and compliance problems. 275 The obligations that such
agreements create invariably conflict with the independent sover-
eignty of member parties. To deal with these conflicts, international
274. Since the Cayman Islands is a dependency of the United Kingdom, the British gov-
ernment made extensive efforts to get the Cayman Turtle Farm established. The farm lost its
major market in 1978 when the Wildlife Service listed the Green Sea Turtle as an endangered
species under the ESA. The farm could no longer sell turtle meat to American restaurants and
lost its shipment point for transporting shells to Japan. The farm attempted unsuccessfully to
obtain an exemption for farm sea turtles and argued that they did not run afoul of CITES
because of the captive breeding exception. Subsequently, the farm filed suit challenging the
ban, but the regulations were upheld. Cayman Turtle Farm, Ltd. v. Andrus, 478 F. Supp. 125
(D.D.C. 1979). After this defeat, the farm turned to the United States Congress where it was
equally unsuccessful. See Relation of the Endangered Species Act on Captive Propagation of
Wildlife, Hearings before the House Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1982).
In 1985, apparently aware that it could not meet the requirements for the CITES' farming
exception, the farm joined France and Suriname in attempting to obtain a ranching exception.
275. For a general discussion of compliance problems at the international level, see R.
FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981); 0. YOUNG, COMPLI-
ANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS (1979).
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agreements utilize various organizational forms ranging from a cen-
tralized administrative agency to a decentralized self-enforcement
structure with minimal administrative involvement. Without a cen-
tral administrative body, any compliance and enforcement takes on a
ragged, almost anarchic quality. Of course, some types of decentral-
ized compliance mechanisms can be effective in certain situations. In-
dividual parties can threaten to impose sanctions on other member
nations that violate the provisions of the agreement. In addition, par-
ties may threaten to withdraw from the agreement to deter other par-
ties from violating its terms. However, the imposition of sanctions
and the withdrawal from the agreement are both drastic measures
which will normally be taken only as a last resort.
There are two structural aspects to CITES which assist in its
compliance. First, by holding biennial consultive meetings, the par-
ties can respond to changing circumstances and directly lobby each
other on specific compliance problems. 276 Second, the CITES Secre-
tariat has evolved into an independent monitoring organization. The
parties to CITES originally delegated responsibility for administration
and funding of the Secretariat to the executive director of UNEP. 277
The executive director in turn delegated administration to the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
("IUCN"). Uneasy over the close relationship between the IUCN
and CITES, the Secretariat staff became employees of the UNEP and
moved into separate quarters in 1984.278 Despite this move, the Sec-
retariat remains a remarkably independent entity which actively
monitors compliance with the terms of CITES.
If the Secretariat comes to the conclusion that there is a specific
compliance or enforcement problem with a listed species, it is re-
quired to inform the appropriate member nation.279 In addition, the
Secretariat may present reports to the biennial conference of parties
concerning CITES' enforcement in particular countries. For exam-
ple, the Secretariat issued a report for the 1985 conference describing
the Secretariat's attempts to improve CITES' implementation and
compliance in Bolivia, Paraguay, and the European Economic Com-
276. See CITES, supra note 2, art. XI § 2.
277. See id. art. XII § 1.
278. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 263.
279. For example, such a notification was sent to the People's Republic of China and the
United States by the Secretariat regarding the giant panda loans. See NOTIFICATION, supra
note 114.
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munity.280 The report led to a resolution to prohibit all CITES trade
with Bolivia, but allowed the individual parties to decide whether
they would actually take such an action.28 1 Despite these tools, the
Secretariat has no direct enforcement power. It ultimately must rely
on its power to persuade member nations to comply with CITES, or
in extreme situations call for sanctions against a party.
The majority of trade in wildlife originates in the developing
countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Most of these products
are transported to luxury consumer markets in the United States, Ja-
pan, and the European Economic Community. The consuming coun-
try must take the lead in enforcing the provisions of CITES. The
ability of a strong consumer market to overwhelm a developing na-
tion's wildlife conservation efforts is illustrated by both the trade in
ivory and sea turtle products. If Japan were to withdraw its reserva-
tion on sea turtles, the consumer market would dry up, and the com-
mercial poaching would end regardless of the producing nation's
policies or enforcement. Similarly, the Toledo Zoo panda loan shows
how an exporting country can be seduced by political and financial
incentives.
Ultimately, enforcement is left up to the individual parties to the
convention and depends upon their integrity and goodwill. The To-
ledo Zoo panda loan exemplifies the fragility of this reliance. The
political and financial incentives were too lucrative for both the Chi-
nese and American authorities. When the nations' authorities
granted permits, there was no way left to prevent the loan, even
though it was obviously detrimental to the species. One potential way
of limiting such misuse of the exceptions to Appendix I is to require
all permits to be approved by the CITES Secretariat. Unfortunately,
such a bureaucratic procedure would be expensive and subject to the
same abuses that have plagued the decentralized permit process. In
the final analysis, the only truly effective enforcement techniques are
the use of public pressure and higher profile legal action by conserva-
tion groups.
282
Similarly, public pressure may be the only method of dealing
with those industrialized nations which provide the consumer mar-
kets that encourage poaching. Japan's restriction on ivory imports in
280. Fi-rH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 287 (res. 5.8.1).
281. Id. at 38 (conf. 5.2).
282. For example, the suit by the World Wildlife Fund challenging the Toledo panda
exhibition sufficiently embarrassed the Chinese and American governments so that these par-
ties discontinued such arrangements.
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the spring of 1989 undoubtedly reflected the torrent of negative pub-
licity it received as the slaughter of elephants became public
knowledge.
B. Determination of "Protected" Species
Most analyses of the ivory crisis consider the problem to be a
failure of enforcement. Undeniably, the collapse of enforcement in
the African countries was instrumental in bringing about the elephant
population crash. However, the population crash also revealed a
weakness in the CITES' listing procedure. At the First Conference of
the Parties to CITES in Berne, the parties adopted criteria to deter-
mine which species were endangered and eligible for protection.
28 3
The criteria they adopted ranged from scientific population studies to
nonscientific reporting of "habitat destruction, heavy trade or other
potential causes of extinction. ' 284 These criteria focused on biological
evidence of population decline. The severity of the threat to the popu-
lation determined whether a species would be listed in Appendix I
and be completely protected from trade, listed in Appendix II and be
subjected to regulated trade, or not be protected at all.
Most criticism of the listing procedure has focused on the lack of
rigor in determining the Berne Criteria. A number of decisions to add
species to the appendices have not been based on any demonstrable
threat to a particular species. 285 However, the ivory crisis indicates a
problem of different dimension. The failure of CITES to move
quickly during the eight year population crash of the African elephant
indicates a lack of an alarm mechanism which will trigger protection
for a species population in sudden decline.
While it is important that member nations retain their sover-
eignty and independence, the Secretariat must play a greater role in
monitoring the status of species. Presently, the convention requires
each member nation to prepare an annual report on its trade in listed
species. These reports are important in monitoring compliance, but
they are not sufficiently comprehensive to monitor the populations of
listed species. At the Third Conference of the Parties to CITES, the
parties adopted a resolution which called for periodic biological stud-
ies of species listed in the appendices at least every ten years. Such
283. FIRST CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 56, at 31.
284. Id.
285. For example, in 1987 the entire hummingbird family Trochilidae was added to Ap-
pendix II, despite little evidence of trade.
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studies are expensive and time consuming. Due to the lack of fund-
ing, the program has not been carried out. The countries engaged in
regulated trade in Appendix II species could finance these efforts.
The Secretariat could evaluate the population studies and trade re-
ports to identify Appendix II species which need to be transferred to
Appendix I, or Appendix I species which need special attention.
C. Controlling Consumer Markets
Another major problem with CITES is its failure to address the
power of the consuming markets to overcome attempts by producing
nations to protect endangered species. The CITES reservation policy
allows a consumer market country like Japan to effectively subvert
the regulatory controls of a producing nation like Indonesia. The
huge Japanese demand for sea turtles is, by itself, a major threat to the
species. Acting like a mercantile vacuum cleaner, it sucks in contra-
band trade from countries which lack effective mechanisms to stop
poaching and smuggling.
Reservations are common in international agreements. It is pos-
sible that without reservation provisions, a number of nations would
not become parties to regulatory treaties such as CITES. These na-
tions would argue that such agreements without reservations are an
abdication of their sovereignty. At the same time, the reservation
provisions can render the listing of a species in either appendix inef-
fective, as Japan's reservation on sea turtles has demonstrated.
CITES has taken a big step toward lessening the negative impact of
reservations where only the market country has taken a reservation.
CITES now requires Appendix II level documentation for countries
with reservations on Appendix I species.286 Ultimately, the solution
to reservation problems is the same as with all enforcement problems:
Public pressure must reduce or eliminate the consumer market,
thereby inhibiting trade in species.
V. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
CITES has failed to stop the deteriorating populations of the Af-
rican elephant, the sea turtle and to a lesser extent, the panda. Even-
tually, the African elephant may yet be saved, trade in sea turtle
products may be reduced or eliminated, and the few pandas available
may be left alone to try and replenish the species. The plight of these
286. FIFTH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 144, at 66.
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species casts grave doubts upon the basic premise of CITES-that the
preservation and conservation of endangered species can coexist with
commercial trade.
However, the mandate to consuming nations to shut down wild-
life trade raises an interesting but difficult ethical problem. Arguably,
the industrial economies exploit the natural resources of developing
countries through the wildlife trade. However, shutting down the
trade eliminates an important source of income for the economies of
lesser developed nations. The impact on a consuming nation is mini-
mal and usually means giving up a luxury item, while a producing
nation gives up a valuable source of much needed income. Unfortu-
nately, the burden of preserving species falls disproportionately on the
producing nations.
One method of resolving this dilemma and providing economic
motivation for the producing nations to resist the draw of the con-
suming market is to transfer payments from developed nations to un-
derdeveloped nations to compensate them for the loss of income.
Common sense and fairness should compel us to compensate those
who shoulder the greatest burden. While CITES has a very small
stick, it has no carrot at all. For example, there is very little positive
reinforcement for Indonesia to improve their protection of sea turtles.
The turtles are not a tourist attraction and provide no income unless
hunted. However, if CITES rewarded Indonesian conservation efforts
with cash payments, the result would be a positive economic induce-
ment to go along with public pressure and moral imperatives to close
the market. A central fund, administered by the CITES Secretariat,
could disburse funds after certifying that a producing country had
made a good faith effort to protect its endangered wildlife. This
would create economic motivation to enforce CITES and provide the
Secretariat with a device for negotiating leverage.
The obvious problem with such a proposal is a lack of funds.
Presently CITES depends on fees collected from the parties. Funding
of international organizations is notoriously inconsistent and is not
easily expandable. However, there are potential sources of funding in
the currently lucrative trade in wildlife. For example, the United
States imports wildlife equal to approximately $600 million a year.
This includes primates for medical research, reptile skins, live parrots,
and other birds. A ten-percent tax on all wildlife imported into the
United States would produce $60 million which could be allocated to
CITES. If the world trade amounts to $5 billion annually, the legal
1990]
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trade in wildlife could fund the fight against the illegal, black market
trade. 287
In the final analysis, CITES as presently structured, is effective
only as a vehicle for public pressure and international opinion. If it is,
as has been suggested, the most successful international treaty con-
cerned with the conservation of wildlife, it is in part because of the
vigorous advocacy of various conservation groups and their skill in
drawing on public support. Nevertheless, public opinion can be
fickle, and with centralization of more power in the Secretariat and a
steady source of income, CITES may continue the battle to preserve
wildlife, even if public interest in the environment wanes. However,
for CITES to be effective, the financial burdens of wildlife preserva-
tion must be reallocated from the developing nations which supply
the wildlife to the consuming nations which demand such products.
287. The system would resemble the use of duck hunting license fees to preserve wetlands.
